Equity and freedom in health care : proceedings of the 10th European Conference of the International Association of Health Policy (Europe) "Equity and Freedom in Health Care", May 21 - 25, 1997 in Wandlitz, Germany by Benos, Alexis et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arbeitspapier Nr. 19/1998 
 
EQUITY AND FREEDOM 
IN HEALTH CARE 
 
edited by 
A. Benos, H.-U. Deppe, St. Iliffe 
 
 
 
Proceedings of the 10
th European Conference of the 
International Association of Health Policy (Europe) 
„Equity and Freedom in Health Care“ 
May 21-25, 1997 in Wandlitz, Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADDRESS IAHP: Klinikum der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Inst. für Medizinische Soziologie, 
Theordor-Stern-Kai 7, 60590 Frankfurt a.M., Germany, Tel.: 0049 69 6301-7610, FAX: 0049 69 6301-6621, 
E-Mail: H.U.Deppe@em.uni-frankfurt.de 
Mai 1998 
   5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abteilung für Medizinische Soziologie 
Leiter: Prof. Dr. Hans-Ulrich Deppe 
 
Zentrum der  Psychosozialen Grundlagen der Medizin 
Klinikum der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität 
Institut für Medizinische Soziologie 
Theodor-Stern-Kai 7 
60590 Frankfurt am Main 
Telefon (0 69) 63 01 - 76 10 
Fax (0 69) 63 01 - 66 21 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
 
Hans-Ulrich Deppe                  5 
EQUITY AND FREEDOM IN HEALTH CARE  
UNDER NEOLIBERAL DICTATORSHIP 
 
 
Steve Iliffe                    9 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT TOWARDS A  
PRIMARY-CARE LED NHS 
 
 
James Munro                  17 
THE BRITISH EXPERIMENT WITH GP FUNHOLDING  
AND ITS EFFECTS ON EQUITY OF ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 
 
 
Alexis Benos                  27 
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE: 
A NECESSITY TO READRESS EQUITY IN HEALTH POLICY 
 
 
Lorenzo Terranova                31 
THE „FREEDOM OF CHOICE“ IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: 
PRIVATISATION OF THE COSTS IN THE ITALIAN CONTEXT 
 
 
Hagen Kühn                  39 
A CRITICAL VIEW OF GLOBAL BUDGETING IN GERMANY’S 
SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM 
 
 
Walter Baumann                45 
SOLIDARITY IN THE STATUTORY HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
 
Rolf Rosenbrock                50 
MODELLING HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN FORMER  
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
 
 
H.-Jochen Zenker, Zahra Mohammadzadeh, Thomas Hilbert      56 
ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES AND HEALTH - 
THE SITUATION IN DIFFERENT WESTERN  
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Dieter Borgers                  61 
EVIDENCE-BASED-MEDICINE (EBM) MEGA-TRIALS  
AND NUMBERS NEEDED TO TREAT (NNT)  
AS IDEALS OF RATIONAL HEALTH CARE 
 
 
 4 
 
 
   5 
EQUITY AND FREEDOM IN HEALTH CARE UNDER NEOLIBERAL DICTATORSHIP 
 
Hans-Ulrich Deppe 
 
Equity and freedom in health care is an ambitious title. Equity is a concept which is not well defined, but for 
freedom we have many definitions. Both concepts have a general character, are overall goals, have historical 
impact and analytical depth.  
 
 1. Equity is not given by nature. In nature we have - as Darwin found out - “the survival of the fittest”. And that 
means constitutively inequality, selection and struggle. This is not compatible with equity. What we want to 
speak about is equity in human life and that means social equity. Social equity is historically mediated and the 
result of human communication, work and power. What it means concretely is changing. It depends upon the 
economic, political and ideological structures of a society. 
 
In social reality differences in social class, gender, geographical location, ethnic or religious group and age 
reflect differences in social privilege. Striking differences in health between richer and poorer nations have long 
been recorded. A child born in a developing country of Africa, Asia or Latin America is roughly ten times more 
likely to die before reaching the age of five than a child born in Europe or North America. Comparable gaps 
exist  within countries: the life expectancy at birth of the  most disadvantaged segment of the population in 
Mexico is 20 years less than that of the most affluent segment. Then there are the gender, ethnic and age-group 
gaps. A study in India showed that girl children aged between one and 23 months were almost twice as likely to 
die by the age of two as were boy children; it concluded that the most likely  explanation was the different 
behaviour of families towards boy and girl children, rather than any biological differences. In 1990, the death 
rates for non-white men in South Africa were double those of men of European background in the same country. 
The US Medicaid programme was designed to ensure health care for disadvantaged children (and their mothers), 
while Medicare ensures health care for the elderly regardless of income. Not only is Medicare far better funded 
than Medicaid, but more than two-third of Medicaid funds go to care for elderly and for disabled adults. All 
these gaps are widening and worsening in most countries of the world. 
 
With this background today social equity means something like “fairness” (John Rawls). It means that people´s 
needs and necessities, rather than social privileges, guide the distribution of opportunities for well-being. It is 
orientated to all and not to some. We have to look at equity in terms of equal access to health care and in terms 
of its contribution to equality in health and social consequences of illness.
1 Political decisions are necessary to 
create and stabilize social equity. This principle lies at the heart of a global initiative launched last year by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 
whose goal is to promote and support practical policies and action to reduce avoidable social gaps in health and 
health care between groups which live at different levels of social privilege.
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2. It is not easy to find a plausible indicator, which makes social equity concrete and transparent. I think the 
social worth (value) of equity can be measured in the way in which a society treats its most vulnerable members. 
That demands priority to the sickest. If we do not understand what it means to take the rights of the ill and     6 
diseased seriously then it is unlikely that we will do so for others who lack the strength or ability to defend 
themselves. This seems to be what good politics and good social medicine are all about. 
 
3. The WHO defines health in terms of physical, social and mental well-being. Producing health and caring for 
sickness and illness makes us more independent, which means more free. Health care is a social instrument to 
develop more human freedom, freedom through health care. 
 
4. Freedom - the chance of freedom, freedom of choice - in human societies is not given by nature. Freedom 
assumes a social subject. The philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel formulated: Freedom is the recognition of 
the necessity. Meanwhile we know that conciousness alone is not enough, but perhaps a first step. In the context 
of  freedom  we  should  try  to  answer  some  questions.  Freedom  from  what?  People  are  dependent  on  their 
existential conditions of life and its social organisation. Freedom at first means to become independent from such 
social  needs.  Over  this  freedom  is  a  necessarily  to  manage  this  process.  Freedom  for  what? This  question 
demands the dimension of autonomy and selfdetermination - not to be determined by nature or other men. And 
not least the question: Freedom for some or freedom for all? We know that modern society can give freedom to 
some but until now not to all. And that freedom for some rests mostly on the shoulders of many.  Socialism is a 
result  of  this  historical  experience  and  was  an  experiment  to  change  it.  In  a  slight  modification  of  Rosa 
Luxemburg, I would say: “Freedom in a democracy has to include the freedom of the other”. 
 
5. Freedom in health care, the freedom to choose special forms of treatments is not easy, because in medicine 
and health care many highly differentiated necessities exist. Therefore we need confidence in experts. Freedom 
of choice is most obvious in the access to health care. That means 
- if all members of a society can enter the health care system, 
- if people can select their physician or expert, whom they trust, 
- if they can choose different forms of medicine: like traditional medicine or alternative medicine.  
And over this 
- if people have the freedom of choice in respect of equal treatment for equal need, 
- and last but not least, if the patients are acknowledged and accepted as autonomous subjects. 
 
We know that this freedom in reality is very limited, mostly by economic but also by educational and regional 
conditions. Often it is confined by the social structure of a society. Within the contemporary neoliberal paradigm 
the market and competition shall expand and enlarge freedom in health care.  But only for some. 
 
6. In the bourgeois society freedom is a quality which corresponds closely with the market - the free market. 
The market  needs free labour forces, free and private properties, free individuals and unlimitted regions to 
expend.  Under  such  conditions  the  market  distributes  the  colletively  produced  values  of  a  society.  This 
distribution depends mainly on private interests. Of course the market itself has no interests - but there is no real 
market without interests. And the market in combination with competition produces selection, polarisation and 
egoism - similar to that which Darwin described for nature. The free market itself as an economic instrument is 
not able to construct social equity. For that we need political decisions which are orientated to the society as a 
hole.     7 
The  development  of  the  market  society  started  politically  with  the  French  revolution.  And  the  French 
revolutionaries  knew  that  “liberté”  alone  is  not  enough  and  so  they  added  “fraternité”  and  “egalité”.  This 
knowledge realized itself in the welfare states of the western European market societies. Under the pressure of 
the working class bourgeoisie itself had to build up different forms of welfare states as barriers against the 
furious forces of the market. And it was not only the welfare states but also the modern human rights. Over this 
the bourgeois society tried to introduce different forms of politically controlled markets. It was and is until now a 
reaction to the exploding market forces, which seem to be unchangeable “physical obligations”. But the social 
organization of health care is not only a reaction to market forces, it too is a condition for the partial stabilization 
and pacification of the market society.  
 
In a democratic society freedom and equity belong together. They are man- made and are a historical result of 
human progress. Social equity is a basis and assumption for social freedom in a democracy - the opportunity of 
freedom for all. Both are concerned with social needs like health and health care. The freedom to have good, 
competent health care in individual situations should be equal. This idea is constitutive for our European welfare 
states, which are relevant parts of our civilisation. And in December 1995 during the mass strike in France, 
which was directed against the social cuts and reductions in the social health insurance, Pierre Bourdieu, the 
French philosopher, formulated in a speach to the striking people: “I will declare our support to all of you, who 
are struggling against the destruction of our civilisation - a civilisation which is strongly combined with the 
existence of the public service, what means the republican equality of right, the right of education, the right of 
health, of culture, of research, of art and especially the right of work”.
3 He critizised the power that the market 
and consumers have occupied within the State. He critizised especially the economists of the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, who urge us powerfully to accept the verdicts of the new Leviathan, the 
financial markets.  We as scientists have to show and demonstrate the abstract and reduced knowledge of the 
market economy as a compensation for missing future humantarian perspectives. We as health workers have to 
show that the patient is not a homo economicus. We have to point out the limits of the market economy. And we 
have to develop knowledge against it, which has more respect for people and their realities. We have to make 
clear that human and social rights, like the right to health which is rooted in social equity and freedom, cannot be 
economized. If they are brought to the market nevertheless, they will be destroyed and with them our social 
culture and political civilisation. 
4  
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THE RETREAT FROM EQUITY  
 
Implications of the shift towards a primary-care led NHS. 
 
Steve Iliffe 
 
 
A PRIMARY CARE LED NHS? 
 
Primary  care  does  not  exist,  being  an  abstraction  invented  by  policy  experts  to  describe  the  patchwork  of 
services in the community that provide the citizen with access to medical care.  The largest component of the 
patchwork , in terms of breadth of contact with the population, is general practice, but community nursing in 
different forms, and  professions allied to medicine contribute to the overall pattern through  Community Trusts.  
This  dominance  of  general  practice    encourages  some  doctors  to  misinterpret  their  status  as  the  totality  of 
primary care, seeing all other professional groups as subordinate in function and themselves in the  central role.  
General practice  can be viewed differently, as a the most problematic element in the patchwork by virtue of its 
size and style of organisation. 
 
From the perspective of the population’s health, general practice is ill-equipped to become the foundation of  a 
reconfigured health service, since the quality of medical care provided by it is so variable and so difficult to 
change.  As a whole general practitioners  do well what they are trained for  - diagnosis of significant medical 
problems - but are less effective in the management of long-term illness, and have limited capacity to prevent ill-
health, despite considerable efforts to re-train and re-orientate over the last two decades. 
 
One  legacy of the diagnostic orientation is a close relationship to the pharmaceutical industry, which remains a  
major  contributor  to  continuing  medical  education  and  underpins  the  focus  on  the  individual  patient,  the 
tendency to medicalise problems and the reliance on chemotherapeutic solutions to problems.  Not only does this 
pattern of biases lead to the neglect of the ‘untreatable’ - including social dimensions of ill-health like disability 
and irremediable disorders like dementia - but it minimises any sense of ‘public health’ and emphasises instead 
the anecdotal recall of problem-solving experiences.    
 
These experiences are themselves changing in character and narrowing in focus.  Since 1980 there has been a 
slow retreat by general practitioners from acute medicine, with a recent rapid withdrawal from out-of-hours work 
and the abandonment of  much maternity care.   The balance has shifted away from acute medical care, where 
general practitioners apply formidable diagnostic and problem-solving experience, towards  the management of 
chronic disorders packaged together with  individual and group preventive work, where skills are more limited.  
The concomitant change in hospital medicine is in the increase in use of A&E departments, the reduction in in-
patient stays and the recent sudden rise in  emergency admissions. 
Neither the background pattern of skills and achievements of general practice, nor the recent changes in work 
content appear to favour the assumption of a leading role in the NHS by this section of the medical profession.  
Why should a group  of professionals  that is refocussing on chronic disease management and responses to risk     10 
factors be seen as more competent to direct the development of services than those who take a wider view of 
population needs? 
 
Whilst this may a logical objection to the notion of a primary care led NHS, political imperatives from both right 
and left collude with professional ambition and converge on this policy option.  The current government favours 
an individualist approach to health and a commercial approach to service organisation,  with the result that the 
idea  of  individual  doctors  buying  specialist  care  for  individual  patients,  or  whole  groups  in  a  job-lot,  has 
particular attraction.  Within the opposition the objective of provider capture of policy development is pursued 
energetically by those advocating  the leading role of general practitioners in the application of public health 
principles, despite the evidence of a decade or more that such a role is not sought by the great majority of  the 
profession.    Both camps seek to give general practice  a vanguard position it does not merit, but only one - the 
market perspective - has gained influence and impact.  
 
THE NHS REFORMS 
 
The National Health Service  is being changed from a State monopoly of medical care organised  through a 
command-and-control structure to a devolved network of  ‘providers’ competing for public funds in a mixed 
economy of medical care.      Britain’s general practitioners have been used as both a model of and a lever for 
this change towards a  managed market  because they have never been integrated into the control structure of the 
NHS, but instead have remained contractors  used by the Department of Health to provide a protective screen 
around its hospitals.   
 
General practice organised as a franchise  has allowed the NHS to develop a system of primary care of adequate 
quality (except, perhaps,in the inner cities) at relatively low cost, whilst doctors in primary care have had the 
economic risks of  practice minimised through salary elements in their reimbursement and subsidy of premises 
and staff costs.  The success of this approach may have  been one of the factors prompting the government to re-
configure the NHS hospital service as a  network of  Trusts contracted to  purchasing authorities. 
 
Current thinking about a primary-care led NHS  suggests that general practice organised as a  franchise can 
effectively manage the market for specialist service,itself re-organised as a franchise,  in the most cost-effective 
way.  This paper argues that, even if this hitherto untested market management function can be fulfilled by 
primary care, the result will be greater variations in the quantity and quality of medical care to the population 
than exist at the moment, and the abandonment of  equity as a goal of health care policy. 
 
 
THE INTERNAL MARKET AND GENERAL PRACTICE 
 
The 1990 GP contract was part of a broader market reform of the NHS which includes plans  that would allow 
larger general practices to hold their own budgets to by a defined range of services from specialists working in  
hospitals - the fundholding option.  In effect this meant that some general practice franchisees could opt to 
extend their local autonomy even further, at the price of running greater risks, in order to catalyse the internal     11 
market in the NHS.  In a sense this  promotion of fundholding represents the creation of a ‘super franchise’, in 
which the subsidies to general practice are greatly increased, alongside the responsibilities and risks, with the 
incentive for general practitioners to join being both the possibility of improving patient care and the potential 
for making greater profits.   
 
The  ‘super  franchise’  option  has  re-introduced    competition  within  general  practitioners,  since  successful 
fundholders would provide better services to patients than non-fundholders whilst retaining surplus funds for 
development of practice premises.  This competitive threat  poses a  challenge to  the equitable provision of 
medical care in Britain because fundholding may : 
 
* enhance the efficiency of  ‘better’ practices at the expense of weaker ones;   
 
* further transfer some medication costs to  users with a consequent increase in ‘non-compliance’ in those with 
low incomes; 
 
* redirect funds from deprived areas to more affluent areas through open and hidden administrative costs; 
 
*  favour some patients before others regardless of clinical need; 
 
* be unable to adhere to a public health agenda; 
 
* substitute generalist for specialist care inappropriately; 
 
* encourage  enrollment in private health insurance programmes and reduce the critical pressure on the NHS 
exerted by the affluent and educated; 
 
* create controlling institutions that serve the interests of a professional group and exclude public influence. 
 
Whilst a few general practitioners embraced the concept of fund holding with enthusiasm at the outset , there 
was initially widespread concern amongst general practitioners that the administrative structure required would 
become a considerable extra burden for busy practices that few were in a position to carry .   The administrative 
overload  has  been  circumvented  by  cash  support  for  investment  in  management  skills  and  information 
technology, so that an increasing number of general practitioners have been drawn towards fund holding.   
 
This  level  of  investment  immediately  separates  fundholders  from  non-fundholders,  whose  subsidies    for 
computerisation and practice management are less, and provides fundholders with efficient internal systems that 
may enhance accessibility (through better appointment systems and time management), improve clinical records 
(through the need to capture clinical data for costing  purposes)  and increase practice income through higher 
rates  of  claiming  fees  for  items  of  service.    These  efficiency  gains    may  be  spin-off  from  investment  in 
management systems, and favour  those practices that are already  better organised at the expense of those that 
are not.     12 
 
 So  far  the  only  area  where  fundholders  have  a  demonstrable    advantage  over  traditional  franchisees  is  in 
reducing prescribing costs .    This is a government objective, but success in cost containment tells us nothing 
about either the quality of care, which may decline as medicine costs are cut, nor the long term economic costs 
of short term savings on prescribing, which may be considerable.   Since medication costs are being transferred 
to patients through higher prescription charges and a widening range of over-the-counter (OTC) medicines, the  
likely end result of downward pressure on prescribing costs is  greater expenditure on medication by those who 
can afford them, and less use of medication by those who cannot. 
 
The economic costs of fundholding are substantial, and include both open costs like management fees, subsidies 
for computerisation and  administrative costs in the practice from the billing and contract review processes, as 
well  as    hidden  costs  like  staff  time  in  Family  Health  Service  Authorities,  Trust  hospitals  and  the  Audit 
Commission    The opportunity costs of developing fundholding are not debated , but  diverting resources to 
already well endowed shire county practices to enhance their purchasing power whilst not spending development 
money on primary care services in deprived areas  (outside the  favoured  London Implementation Zone ) is  a 
further challenge to equity. 
 
 The political costs may be equally significant, given the damage done to equity by fund holders buying speedier 
treatment for their patients - 'fast tracking' - which appears impossible to prove but is  accepted as fact whenever  
fundholders and provider units speak off the record.  
 
Fundholders are as much a threat as an opportunity for local health  planning.   Fundholders' decisions about 
placing resources are primarily budget-led because the pressure to avoid overspending is so great.  Overspent 
fundholders may simply lack the money to adhere to wider health policies, even if they want to.   Adverse 
selection of expensive patients may have a negative impact on uptake of immunisation amongst children, for 
example, or on the workload of mental health services in a locality. 
 
The  costs  of  specialist  care  may  be  reduced  by  better  chronic  disease  management  in  the  community,  and 
through primary and secondary prevention in general practice, but  we cannot be certain about that and the 
opposite  may  be  true.  Good  quality  primary  care  may  identify  more  problems  amenable  to  treatment  by 
specialists, whilst inadequate screening, health maintenance and disease management by cost-conscious general 
practitioners  may  create  more  problems  for  specialists,  requiring  more  money  not  less  to  solve  them.      A 
mechanism that encourages reduced referral or prescribing on the assumption that other forms of treatment will 
than develop to make this reduction possible is running far ahead of the evidence.   
Private health insurance may prove a useful tool for fundholders, since patients using such insurance may save 
the fundholder  money that can be spent on those without insurance.  The privately insured patient then appears 
to be a good Samaritan to the less affluent, but  covertly diverts specialist expertise away from the public sector 
(especially in surgery) whilst diminishing the critical impact of the educated and affluent on the quality of  NHS 
care. 
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Finally,  the coalescence of fundholding practices into consortia  will create mini-Health Authorities controlled 
by general practitioners, where there is no prospect of  institutionalised public influence or control.  Whilst this is 
absent from current purchasing authorities, there is at least the prospect of an easy adaptation of  the existing 
structure to democratic input, and even to merger with local authorities.  It is difficult to see how fundholding 
consortia could match this prospect, except perhaps through the adoption of  the kind of ‘community oriented’ 
outreach to local populations  tried in the USA. 
 
 
BREAKING THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER MONOPOLY 
 
Fundholding was meant to kick-start the internal market and make  hospitals more competitive. It has done that 
to some extent, but it has also triggered resistance amongst those who saw fundholding for what it could be - 
competition  amongst  British-style  Health  Maintenance  Organisations.  The  result  was  a  confusing  conflict 
between  market  oriented  fundholding  and  its  socialised  rival,  locality  commissioning,  in    which  both  sides 
expressed their common aim - to shape the health service according to their own interests. 
 
This was not what the Government wanted.  Fundholding had become to its GP advocates an end, not a means,  
and locality commissioning  had restored some sense of planning to the idea of a primary care led NHS.  The 
political problem for the government in the early 1990’s was clear.  General practitioners did not want to be 
subject to competition, but instead sought management positions in the managed market.  The solution was 
equally clear. The monopoly that General Practitioners  had over primary care had to be broken, so that they 
would be forced into competition with each other and with other primary care providers.  Then the market 
mechanisms for a privatised health service would be nearly complete, and the security provided by a certain role 
in a service with fixed boundaries would be replaced by the insecurities of competition in services with fluid 
boundaries.  Stephen Dorrell  hinted at the shape of things to come early in 1996 in an issue of Purchasing 
Bulletin when he used two pages to describe the potential of a primary care led NHS without mentioning general 
practice once, but nobody in the profession took the hint. 
 
The spate of documents released at the end of 1996 that fed into the  Primary Care Act passed at the end of the 
Major government revealed the solution.  The policy problem for the government in its plans to privatise the 
health service lay in general practice.  General practitioners would therefore be given three choices.  Either stay 
as independent contractors to Health Authorities, but working under increasingly tight control and direction, or 
take extra risks and responsibilities by becoming mini-Trusts, or join existing Trusts as salaried employees.   
 
If the government is successful those general practitioners who retain their traditional relationship to the Health 
Authorities will need to work within increasingly complex rules which distinguish between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ 
tasks, and will spend increasing amounts of time on the administration needed to maximise their income from a 
widening range of fees for specific services.  The days of the open-ended and vaguely defined contract are over, 
and the age of quality standards, guidelines and  accountability has begun.  The consolation prize is security of 
tenure, for these doctors will remain on the Medical List where their contracts are guaranteed up to the age of 70. 
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Those who opt for status as mini-Trusts will not only compete with other Trusts to provide primary care, but will 
eventually  loose their security of tenure. No more jobs for life!  The ambitious GP-Trust will then need to fend 
off competition from the local Acute Hospital Trust, or the Community Trust, either or both of which may offer 
primary  care  services.    They  will  be  able  to  do  this  because  they  attract  general  practitioners  into  their 
organisation,  employing  them  on  a  salaried  basis,  but  probably  on  relatively  short  term  contracts.    Those 
practices which opt for linkage to existing Trusts will be sheltering under expansive wings, but at the price of 
their GPs loosing their autonomy and security of tenure. 
 
The  result  will  be  the  end  of  general  practice  as  a  nationwide  system  for  providing  medical  care  in  the 
community distinct from other, more specialised services.  It will continue in its traditional form in some parts, 
but its advocates will struggle to survive and  as time passes may well seek shelter in bigger organisations - just 
as fundholders have tended to aggregate into larger units.  Generalism will continue in many forms, and no wise 
Trust  will dispense  with it because European and  American experience teaches that direct public access to 
specialist care is expensive, so there will still be a place for general practitioners inside acute and community 
Trusts. 
 
Is this a problem?  Not at first sight, because the separation of  general practice from hospital medicine on one 
hand, and other community services on the other, has bedeviled the growth and development of good quality 
medical  care  for  decades.    Compartmentalisation  of  services  has  meant  unnatural  compartmentalisation  of 
patients’  problems,  with  only  limited  escape  from  this  problem  through  repeated  but  usually  disappointing 
attempts at  joint working. A single service that combines general and specialist skills, however organised, may 
seem a more attractive option than the old divide between generalists and specialists.   
 
There are two particularly obvious hazards in this process. The first is that Trusts may  develop primary care to 
retaliate against fundholders who have destabilised Trusts through contract shifting.  A large and aggressive 
Acute Trust could  recruit the patient base from under fundholding without necessarily being able to deliver 
primary care of the same quality. The American experience of such competition between providers is that the 
bad drives out the good, so whilst many would gain much pleasure from  fundholders’ discomfort, the damage to 
primary care might be less desirable. 
 
The second hazard is adverse selection, with competing primary care providers looking for healthy people who 
make little use of services and avoiding the iller, older, poorer population which costs more to service. Here the 
beleaguered fundholders may find a defence against  aggressive Trusts, creaming of the younger and more 
affluent  with offers of physiotherapy and counseling in-house whilst the Trust’s primary care services are left  
with the seriously sick.  The case mix matters, because funding for the illest people is unlikely to match their 
needs, forcing Trusts with primary care ambitions to provide limited services to those who need most.  The 
experience of cash-strapped American public hospitals struggling with escalating demand and dwindling staff 
morale would then be repeated in Britain. 
 
Can Britain’s new Labour government escape this legacy?  Probably not, given the interests mobilising behind it 
and the obvious benefits of local mergers of generalists and specialists. But it could keep overtly commercial     15 
players out, maintaining a truly ‘internal’ market whilst controlling the process of innovation tightly - through 
the Health Authorities - to minimise destructive competition at local level.  Trusts which can negotiate local 
deals  with  the  majority  of  general  practitioners  to  create  a  single  service  should  be  encouraged  to  do  so.  
Attempts  to  offset  the  power  of  fundholders  by  developing  alternative  sources  of  primary  care  should  be 
monitored closely to avoid poor services emerging for poor people, and the capitation basis for funding services 
should be modified to reflect patterns of illness more accurately.  Above all, the public needs to be involved in 
the debate about the future provision of health services, with a Labour government emphasising the issues of 
needs, justice and equity. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The possibility of a primary care led NHS has risen towards the top of the political agenda on at least two 
occasions since 1911, but has always been a weak idea trying to become a core concept.  The nature of general 
practice and of general practitioners militates against an inversion of the existing power relationship between 
hospital specialists  and generalists, even though fundholding appears to offer this opportunity.  Fundholding  
could further erode any prospect of equitable provision of medical care  to the population because it favours 
unequal development of services and unequal  treatment of individuals.  The political imperative to distribute 
resources justly and according to need is best met through a policy and planning mechanism in which the power 
of those with an overview of the public’s health balances the power of those in daily contact with a population of 
individuals, such as locality commissioning. 
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THE  BRITISH  EXPERIMENT  WITH  GP  FUNDHOLDING  AND  ITS  EFFECTS  ON  EQUITY  OF 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 
James Munro 
Introduction 
Of  the  policy  changes  heralded  by  the  British  government’s  1989  white  paper  Working  for  patients  and 
introduced into the NHS in 1991, general practitioner fundholding has perhaps been — and still remains — the 
most controversial. 
From the start, the idea of giving doctors fixed budgets to pay for the care of their patients raised a host of 
concerns. How would the budget be set? Would patients still receive the care they needed? What would happen 
if the budget ran out? Would the patients of non-fundholders be disadvantaged? These questions, and others, 
were  posed  and  debated  vigorously  by  media  commentators,  politicians,  patient  organisations  and  policy 
analysts. 
The high public profile of the fundholding scheme has been associated with a relatively high research profile. Of 
all the elements of the 1991 reform package, fundholding has attracted the greatest attention from researchers. 
However, most of this research has addressed questions relating to referral rates, prescribing activity and the 
costs of the scheme. Very little has focused on considerations of equity. 
Yet fundholding has been controversial precisely because of the potential it holds to threaten the equity of access 
to care which many people hold to be a core value of the NHS, and which has long been pursued as an explicit 
policy goal. 
In this paper I outline the incentives inherent in fundholding which represent threats to equity, and review some 
of the available evidence on whether fundholding really has damaged equity of access to care. 
Since the election of a Labour government in Britain in May 1997, the future of fundholding has been placed in 
doubt.  Nonetheless,  the  issues  examined  here  will  remain  important  whatever  form  of  purchasing  replaces 
fundholding.  In  particular,  the  question  of  biased  patient  selection  will  remain  important  in  any  future 
organisation of health care in which those paying for care are able to select, to any degree, which patients they 
will cover. Health authorities which must pay for the health care of a population defined geographically can 
exert little or no selection. By contrast, fundholders, total purchasing projects, multifunds and other forms of 
purchasing based on lists of “enrollees” can potentially be very selective towards their patients, and will always 
have an incentive to do so in order to minimise costs. 
The extent to which purchasers are able or willing to respond to the various incentives discussed here remains to 
be shown, and will vary from place to place and from time to time. But so long as equity of access to care 
remains  a  core  value  for  the  health  service,  it  will  be  important  to  monitor  current  and  future  forms  of 
organisation to ensure that they do not lead to an inequitable distribution of care.   18
The fundholding scheme 
Origin 
There is some debate over the real origins of the fundholding policy. It emerged from the Government’s NHS 
review of 1988 and was formally set out, as “the practice budgets scheme”, in the 1989 white paper Working for 
Patients.
1  The  then  Secretary  of  State  for  Health,  Kenneth  Clarke,  has  since  claimed  the  idea  as  his  own, 
asserting that ‘on holiday on a headland near Pontevedra in Galicia, I came up with GP fundholders’.
2 
Yet it is clear that the notion of devolving budgets to general practitioners for some elements of care has a much 
longer history than this. The Department of Health had been investigating ideas for reforming primary care in the 
early 1980s, and had examined the US experience of Health Maintenance Organisations (HMOs). The idea of 
budgets held by primary care doctors had been proposed in the UK in a speculative way by Marshall Marinker
3, 
and Alan Maynard had been developing proposals along similar lines at more or less the same time.
4 
Aims of the scheme 
The aims of “the practice budgets scheme” were not explicitly stated in Working for Patients. However, the 
white paper did suggest that the scheme would provide both GPs and hospitals with an incentive to “put patients 
first”, and that the result would be “better care for patients, shorter waiting times, and better value for money”. 
No mention was made of the possibility of perverse incentives provided by the scheme, nor specifically of the 
incentive to avoid or reduce expenditure on costly patients. 
However,  further  detail  was  set  out  in  Working  Paper  3,  one  of  a  series  of  implementation  papers  which 
followed  shortly  after  the  publication  of  the  white  paper.
5  In  paragraph  6.2  of  the  working  paper,  the 
Government explicitly acknowledged, but dismissed, the risk of adverse selection. 
Practices participating in the scheme  will  not be expected to be selective over  who  may be 
registered with them... Budgets will be set rationally and fairly to ensure that doctors have no 
reason to refuse patients for financial reasons... The Government does not believe that doctors 
will seek to remove patients from their lists on budgetary grounds nor be slow to accept patients. 
The way in which the scheme would minimise the incentive for doctors to avoid costly patients was outlined in 
paragraph 3.9 of the working paper. 
There will be rare cases in which the cost of necessary hospital treatment falling within the scope 
of the scheme would be exceptionally high or represent an unpredictable call on the GP’s budget 
either due to a succession of one-off treatments or continuing care. Such cases should not be 
allowed to distort hospital referral practices and budgetary concerns cannot be allowed to affect 
good patient care. The Government therefore proposes that costs for any individual within a year 
in excess of, say, £5000 will be charged to the patient’s DHA’s budget. 
This  “stop  loss”  arrangement,  designed  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  adverse  patient  selection,  was  in  fact 
introduced exactly as Working Paper 3 had stated. In 1994 the limit to the cost of any one patient to the fund in a 
single year was raised from £5000 to £6000.   19
The Government’s view was that the stop loss mechanism, taken together with the arrangements for setting 
budgets, provided a sufficient safeguard to avoid patient selection. This was clearly expressed in the introduction 
to the working paper. 
The scheme will be structured to ensure that GPs have no financial incentives to refuse to treat 
any categories of patients or accept them onto their lists. 
Criteria for joining the scheme 
Fundholding has been a voluntary scheme which practices may choose to join, or not, as they wish. The original 
proposals published in Working Paper 3 gave only two criteria for participation: that practices should have a 
registered list of at least 11,000 patients; and “an ability to manage budgets”.
5  
In fact, the first of these criteria was relaxed so that in 1991 first wave fundholders needed a minimum list size of 
9,000 to join the scheme. The required minimum list size was further lowered in subsequent years so that, by 
April 1996, a list size of only 5,000 patients was necessary. 
What the fund covers 
In  the  scheme  introduced  in  April  1991  which,  in  the  light  of  the  subsequent  introduction    of  community 
fundholding and total purchasing schemes, has become known as “standard fundholding”, the budget allocated 
to fundholders was to purchase the following services for patients: 
•  a defined list of hospital services, including most elective surgery and almost all outpatient attendances; 
•  community health services, such as visits from community nurses and health visitors, community mental 
health care and community or outpatient services for people with learning disability; 
•  direct access services, such as physiotherapy; 
•  diagnostic tests and investigations provided on an outpatient basis; 
•  drugs and appliances prescribed by the GP. 
In addition, the fund contains an element to pay for staff employed by the practice who are not involved in 
managing the fund. A separate management allowance to the practice is allocated to cover the costs of managing 
the fund itself. 
In 1993/94, a typical standard fundholding practice was responsible for a total fund budget of about £1.7m.
6 Of 
this sum, the Audit Commission estimated that about 55 per cent would be spent on hospital and community 
services, 38 per cent on prescribing and 7 per cent on practice staff. 
Potential threats to equity 
It is clear from the discussion above that, in creating the fundholding scheme, the Government’s purpose was to 
introduce a structure of financial incentives which would influence the behaviour of both general practitioners 
and  secondary  care  providers.  Specifically,  the  incentives  were  intended  to  encourage  cost-consciousness, 
efficiency, and innovation on the part of both primary and secondary care.   20
But apart from these generally positive effects, it is clear that any such system may also introduce incentives for 
actors to behave in ways contrary to the intentions of the policymakers — so-called “perverse incentives”. The 
fundholding scheme introduced a range of new perverse incentives, as well as reinforcing some which existed 
prior to the scheme. It is these which threaten to result in differential access to both primary and secondary care 
for some groups of patients. 
Patient selection by fundholders 
Fundholders are required to pay for some major elements of the total health care used by their patients from a 
fixed budget. One way to respond to this requirement is to concentrate on improving the efficiency of care 
provided. A  second  way  is to try to avoid costly patients, either through selecting only apparently  healthy 
patients from those who apply to register with the practice, or through encouraging those with chronic or costly 
conditions to leave. 
Patient selection by providers of health care 
Only  some  of  the  patients  on  a  provider’s  elective  admission  waiting  list  will  be  patients  of  fundholding 
practices. The others, who are patients of non-fundholders, will have their elective care paid for by the local 
health authority. Depending  on the form of the contract each of these two distinct purchasers has  with the 
provider, there is a possible incentive for providers to preferentially select patients of fundholders. 
This may occur in the common situation where fundholders pay for patients on a “cost-per-case” basis while the 
health authority has a block contract. Towards the end of a financial year, providers may have fulfilled the 
requirements  of  the  block  contract,  which  cannot  yield  further  income  through  further  admissions  of  non-
fundholder’s patients. By contrast, further admissions of fundholder’s patients will bring additional income. 
In this situation, there is a strong incentive for providers to admit patients of fundholders in preference to those 
of non-fundholders. The result would be shorter waiting times for some patients, unrelated to their clinical need. 
It is the suggestion that this might occur which has led to the claim that fundholding has encouraged a “two tier” 
health service. 
Setting the fundholder’s budget 
In addition to minimising costs, fundholders may attempt to maximise the budget which is set for the practice. 
To date, budgets have been set on the basis of the historical activity of the practice in the year prior to becoming 
a fundholder, and modified from this base in subsequent years by some locally determined multiplier.  
Setting the budget in this way introduces an incentive to increase prescribing, referral activity, or both in the year 
prior to joining the scheme, to artificially inflate the initial budget which the practice receives. Inevitably, if 
some practices are able to secure budgets which are greater than those needed to care for their patients, then the 
resources available for the treatment of other patients must be reduced. 
Under-treatment 
Purchasing health care from a fixed budget also introduces the possibility that patients who might benefit from 
some  intervention  will  be  denied  it.  There  is  an  incentive  for  under-treatment  within  primary  care  (since   21
prescribing costs are included in the fund) as well as in referral to secondary care for those procedures payable 
from the fund. 
Cost-shifting 
A further way in which the fixed fundholder’s budget may be protected is to act in such a way that costs which 
would normally fall on that budget are paid by somebody else. There are a number of budgets to which costs 
might be shifted, as follows: 
The health authority 
If the patient can be referred to hospital as an emergency, or attends the Accident and Emergency department, 
then the local health authority rather than the fundholder must pay. For some conditions there may be an element 
of discretion on the part of the GP as to whether a patient should be referred as an elective case or as an 
emergency. 
Patients 
While the cost of very many health care activities could clearly not be shifted to users, some potentially could. 
The most plausible would be to encourage patients to buy those treatments which are available over-the-counter, 
rather than prescribe them. 
Private insurers 
On occasions when a patient has private health insurance and needs elective surgery, there is the possibility of 
referring privately and asking the patient to claim on their insurance, thus shifting the cost from the fund to the 
insurer. 
Restraints on perversity 
It should be emphasised that the points made above relate only to the incentives created by the fundholding 
scheme. While the incentives for perversity may exist, it does not follow that the various actors in the system 
will respond to them in this way, and for the most part it remains to be shown whether or not fundholders have in 
fact responded in the ways suggested. There are four main forces which may restrain such a response. 
Competing incentives 
Other incentives may exist which encourage action opposite to that noted above. For example, if budgets are re-
calculated from time to time on the basis of historical activity, there is an incentive to maintain within-fund 
activity rather than minimise it. 
Attenuation of incentives 
Arrangements may be introduced within the system with the aim, explicitly or implicitly, of attenuating an 
existing perverse incentive. An example discussed above is that of the “stop loss” mechanism which would be 
expected to blunt the incentive to avoid high-cost patients.   22
Sanctions 
Behaviour which is recognised as against the interests of patients or the system as a whole may be explicitly 
outlawed, with the threat of sanction if discovered. The early recognition that patients of fundholders may have 
shorter waiting times than those of non-fundholders at some trusts led to explicit instruction from the NHS 
Executive that admission should be on the basis of clinical need and not according to the status of the purchaser. 
Ethical codes 
Finally, perverse incentives may not evoke a response if actors in the system regard it as contrary to their 
professional ethical standards. Thus, if patient selection by fundholders does not occur, this may be because 
doctors believe strongly in the ideal of equality of access to primary care. 
Available research on fundholding 
Of the policy changes which were introduced in the 1991 reforms, the fundholding scheme has probably been 
the most researched feature. Despite this, little evidence is available on the question of whether the perverse 
incentives outlined above have turned out to have any effect in practice. 
Effects of fundholding on referral, prescribing and costs 
Most of the research which has been carried out to date has focused on the intended outcomes of the scheme, in 
terms of effects on prescribing, referral and overall costs. A number of authoritative reviews of this evidence are 
available.
7 8 9 10 11 Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that prescribing costs and referrals have risen at a 
slower rate in fundholding practices than in non-fundholding practices. 
A number of commentators have pointed out that the effect of such changes on equity, and indeed efficiency, 
remains unknown.
11 12 13 As with all studies of variation in medical practice, we do not know whether lower rates 
of treatment mean that unnecessary interventions have been reduced, or that some people have been denied 
needed  care.  It  would  be  interesting,  for  example,  to  know  whether  the  fall  in  prescribing  in  fundholding 
practices has been accompanied by an increase in spending by patients on over-the-counter drugs for minor 
conditions, but no study has examined this. 
Patient selection by fundholders 
Concern that fundholding would lead to biased patient selection on the basis of cost were expressed as soon as 
the scheme was announced. 
Scheffler, a US health policy analyst, compared the incentives created by fundholding with those familiar from 
the American experience of  HMOs.
14 Arguing that “adverse selection with practices at financial risk may create 
undesirable market incentives”, he noted the difficulty of compensating for differing levels of risk, given that 
that biased selection of patients may be deliberate but subtle: 
If capitation payments are adjusted upwards for the elderly, then practices will be keen to attract 
old people who are in good health. One American HMO invited applications to its plan at a dance 
it sponsored for the elderly on the second floor of a building without a lift.   23
Anecdotal evidence 
There has been some anecdotal evidence suggesting that some GPs might be responding to the incentive to 
remove costly patients from their lists. Such evidence has appeared mainly in the form of a trickle of press 
reports which followed the introduction of fundholding.
15 Surprisingly some doctors have admitted, albeit in 
anonymous media surveys, to removing or turning away patients they perceive as “high demand”.
16 The issue 
has also been debated in parliament, with some MPs claiming that the number of patients being removed from 
doctors’ lists has increased and citing examples of patients being removed for no apparent reason.
17 
Systematic evidence 
In contrast to the public and media attention, there has been very little research into the question of whether 
systematic patient selection has actually occurred as a result of fundholding. 
The  “threat  of  cream  skimming”  was  extensively  discussed  by  Matsaganis  and  Glennerster  in  a  study  of 
expenditure by a single fundholding practice.
18 They identified a number of patient groups (for example, patients 
with diabetes, heart disease or mental illness) who would pose potentially high costs to a fund, and calculated: 
The potential financial gains from a discriminating strategy against a single patient group could 
be up to fifty thousand pounds. Equally lucrative could be a strategy actively seeking to register 
healthy individuals. 
However, they did not examine whether such discrimination was, in fact, occurring. 
One issue closely related to patient selection, on which some limited research does exist, is that of the forcible 
deregistration of patients at the request of their doctor. General practitioners’ terms of service have always 
allowed doctors to require the relevant health authority that a patient be removed from their list, without having 
to give a reason.
19 Only two studies have been carried out which focus on removal from a doctor’s list. 
McDonald et al conducted a telephone survey of 89 GPs who had removed one or more patients from their list 
during a three month period.
20 Excluding those patients who were removed because they moved out of the area 
(27% of removals), the commonest reasons given for removal were “unreasonable requests for medication” (the 
majority of which were related to addictive drugs), “unreasonable requests for home visits”, and “threatening or 
rude behaviour to doctors or staff”. 
Perry surveyed all 97 FHSAs in England and Wales, of whom 35 replied. 
21 Her data suggested a modest 
increase in the number of removals over the period 1990-94, with removal rates per GP higher in urban than in 
rural  areas.  The  data  was  not  detailed  enough  to  compare  removal  rates  between  fundholding  and  non-
fundholding practices. 
Perry additionally surveyed GPs in Kent to determine why a doctor might decide to deregister a patient. The 
commonest reasons given were violent or abusive behaviour, “inappropriate use of services”, loss of trust and 
persistent non-compliance. Unsurprisingly, the costliness of treatment was not given as a possible reason. 
However, research  we  have  recently conducted in Sheffield has directly examined the possibility of biased 
patient selection by fundholders. 
22 We examined the hospital costs associated with over 40,000 patients moving 
between primary care doctors in Sheffield over a two year period. Broadly speaking, the results of this work 
suggest  that  across  the  population  as  a  whole,  fundholders  have  not  been  systematically  selecting  patients   24
according to their costliness. However, it does seem likely that fundholders are avoiding a small number of very 
expensive patients. Further work is now required to discover whether particular patient groups, such as those 
with diabetes or coronary heart disease, are also likely to suffer adverse selection. 
Patient selection by providers 
Many hospital managers will admit unofficially that patients of fundholders are selected preferentially from 
waiting lists, for the reasons given above. However, official policy is that such “two-tierism” should not and 
does not occur, and no manager will admit it on the record. 
However, at least two studies have now confirmed that waiting times for elective surgical admission are shorter 
for patients of fundholders than for patients of non-fundholders. 
23 24  In addition, in Sheffield we have carried 
out a month-by-month analysis of the proportion of admissions to various hospitals and clinical specialties over a 
year which come from fundholding and non-fundholding practices. The early results of this work suggest that in 
some hospitals, and in some specialties, the proportion of admissions coming from fundholders rises steadily in 
the last 3 months of the financial year. This pattern is seen only for admissions payable by the fundholder, and 
not for other admissions, and is exactly the pattern one would predict from the selective incentive described 
above. 
Budget setting 
In the first years of the fundholding scheme there was much debate over whether budgets had been set fairly, 
with a widespread perception that fundholders were being over-resourced by comparison with patients paid for 
by the local health authority. Research evidence seemed to support this view, 
25 although as fundholding has 
spread  more  widely  and  finance  managers  have  become  more  sophisticated  it  seems  likely  that  this  initial 
inequality has now lessened. 
Cost shifting 
Again, very little evidence  is available on  whether cost-shifting  has occurred. Because of the  incentive  for 
fundholders to send patients to hospital as emergency rather than elective cases, one study examined changes in 
the number of emergency and elective patients with certain surgical conditions sent to hospital in one region.
26 
study found no change as a result of fundholding. 
No research has examined whether costs have been shifted to users, or to private insurers. However, insurance 
companies  have  complained  that  the  number  of  claims  people  make  on  their  private  health  insurance  has 
increased rapidly in recent years, along with the average cost of each claim. 
Conclusions 
There were very good reasons to suspect, at the start of the fundholding experiment, that the scheme could and 
would lead to systematic inequalities in access to care, unrelated to clinical or social need. Indeed, it was argued 
that the very fact that fundholding was commoner in affluent than poor areas made matters even worse by 
introducing a bias against care for those in greatest need — another example of the “inverse care law”.
27   25
While evidence on what actually happened is patchy and limited, many of the gloomy predictions have proved 
correct. Although there is not widespread or gross patient selection by GPs, there has been some effect on those 
with very costly conditions. It is clear that there is inequity in access to secondary care. On the present, limited, 
evidence cost-shifting does not seemed to have occurred, but there has been — and may still be — inequity in 
setting budgets for practices. 
It is clear that the incentives for an unfair system exist, and that in some places, and to some extent, these have 
resulted in exactly that. Now, as both primary care and health care purchasing move away from fundholding to 
new and untested forms of organisation, it will remain as important as ever that the implications for equity in 
health care of whatever replaces fundholding are fully understood by policymakers, professionals and the public. 
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COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN PRIMARY HEALTH CARE: 
A NECESSITY TO READRESS EQUITY IN HEALTH POLICY. 
Alexis Benos 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Greece the population is covered by several social insurances schemes. workers are covered by the 
bigger public owned insurance scheme (IKA), farmers by another (OGA), public servants have their 
own  social  security  scheme,  the  bank  employees  likewise,  and  so  on.  Health  care  services  are 
characterised by a gigantic hospital sector functionning in a doctor-centred, autocratic and centralised 
mode, overspending in high technology without any concordance with the real needs of the population. 
This policy has produced a cluster of hospitals services in Athens and Thessaloniki and an irrational - 
in  relation  to  the  population´s  needs  -  allocation  of  resources  enhancing  mainly  favouring  the 
development of specialist and high-tech services. 
 
The 1983 law which established the Greek National Health Service included the already-existing  state-
owned hospital sector and established a tax-financed network of Primary Health Care Centres in the 
rural  areas.  The  plan  to  create  urban  health  centres  was  abandoned  for  economic  and  political 
reasons.
(1) The population of urban areas either uses hospital outpatient departments or is driven to the 
private sector to meet its primary care needs. The private sector has dramatically expanded in the last 
decade, investing mainly in high-tech services, especially diagnostic devices and procedures. This trend 
is a typical example of private economic parasitism as all these investments have as a prerequisite 
contracts with the public insurance schemes and therefore  are based on  public funds. This parasitic 
system, which has a lot of characteristics with the Italian experience,
(2) is determining, to an important 
extent,  the  economic  and  strategic  crisis  of  the  public  sector  of  the  health  services  in  Greece, 
characterised mainly by a parallel expansion of unnecessary costs and a sharp rise of unmet real needs 
of the population.  
 
The main characteristics of the Greek health services are accurately descibed by JT Hart´s  Inverse 
Care Law.
(3) The prevailing middle-class mentality, intensively promoted by the media, the private 
insurance companies and the medical-industrial complex, promotes the expansion of a consumerism of 
diagnostic, curative and usually unnecessary services, leading to an explosion of iatrogenic disease 
which is feeding demand back into a new circle of services.  This parasitic system produced a situation 
where Greece has the highest rate of CT scanners per inhabitant in the E.U., when still  in 1994 deaths 
due  to  tetanus  demonstrated  partial  immunization  coverage  of  the  population.  Under  the  same 
socioeconomic pressures vaccination against Hepatitis B was provided to the children of middle class 
and white and blue collar employees, whilst social and ethnic minorities, refugees and immigrants - 
populations with a far higher prevalence of Hepatitis B - where excluded by a market led policy.
(4) 
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EQUITY IN HEALTH AND EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
Health is determined by the socioeconomic and natural environment. Equity in health, therefore, is not 
feasible in a context of social inequalities.
(5) This implies that  health is not given and can be considered 
only  as  a  social  right  which  can  be  achieved  not  in  an  individual  basis  but  as  a  result  of  social 
changes.
(6) Stressing the existing inequalities in health and their explanation is one way to address the 
need for the re-emergence of  social values like solidarity and societal responsibility. 
 
Equity  in  health  care,  i.e.  in  the  distribution  of  health  services,  implies  a  resource  allocation  that 
ensures  equal access for equal need, equal utilization for equal need, equal quality for equal need.
(7) 
The experience of the British National Health Service (NHS), being an important example of an effort 
to assure equity in health care in a national level, proves that equity in health cannot be achieved if only 
health care services are equitably distributed.
(8)    
 
The current widescale neoliberalist offensive is already increasing inequities in both health and health 
services in all European countries. Therefore, besides the goal of equity in the allocation of health 
services, action also needs to be taken in order to promote equity in health by eliminating  the causes of 
ill health.  
 
The relaunch of the Health for All strategy focusing more intensively and concretely on community 
involvement is an urgent need in order to build the necessary social alliances that could resist and 
defend health as a social right. 
 
 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE: THE NEW PARADIGM   
The strategic crisis of the health services is a result of the overt epistemological crisis of the medical 
paradigm dominant during the 20th century. Disease-and-organ targeted, hospital-and-doctor-centred 
this biomedical paradigm is now under the full control of the biotechnology industry and determined by 
the market incentives of competition and short-term profit, enhancing over-medicalisation and over-use 
of high-tech interventions.
(9) The emerging new paradigm of new Primary Health Care focuses on the 
developement of holistic and community based services responding to the real needs of the population 
and  therefore  building  up  public  health  at  a  local  level.  The  British  experience  implementing  the 
comprehesive coverage of all the population with locally based primary care services and introducing 
the gatekeeping role of the General Practitioners produced an important step forward in the period of 
its implementation. Neverthless it was built as (and remains) a mainly curative and disease-targeted 
service, doctor-centred in its functioning and excluding any community participation and involvement.  
Characteristics that possibly  can explain, partly at least, the NHS crisis and especially the limited 
resistance to its dismantlement. 
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In order to complete the new PHC paradigm two functioning dimensions have to be implemented:  
•  multidisciplinary  team  work,  positively  replacing  the  autocratic  and,  limited  in  terms  of 
effectiveness, role of the doctor- centred model, and 
•  community involvement in order to replace the consumerist model. With the help of proactive 
activities, information and mobilisation of the local population in order to promote participative 
democracy in local level.
(10) Needs assessment and the decisions for the actions to be taken  in local 
level could be a result of some kind of participative structure. The active involvement of the local 
community  in  the  decision  making  for  the  local  health  problems  is  indispensable  to  build  a 
resistance movement against barbarism and could be the basis for  the common struggle for equity 
in health. 
 
 THE TRIANDRIA PRIMARY HEALTH CARE UNIT 
The Triandria Primary Health Care Unit is a community based project designed with the intention to 
implement and develop a model of health services covering the following dimensions: 
•  to develop and evaluate the feasibility of a network of primary health care services in an urban 
social setting  responding to the real needs of the local community. 
•  to promote active community involvement in health policy. The Unit is funded and controlled by 
the local authorities, an innovative situation for the Greek social setting. Another expression of 
community involvement is the implementation of participative structures on specific problems and 
interests (healthy  women committee, healthy workers committee, sports and exercise, diabetics, 
etc). 
•  to  shift  scientific  research  and  academic  activities  from  their  traditional  “intramural”  and  self-
serving environment towards a developmental research assessing and responding to the real 
needs of the community.  
•  to  shift  medical  education  from  the  “disinfected”  hospital  environment  towards  a  community 
oriented education, i.e. the exposure to the real world, where people live, work and its ill-health is 
determined by their social and economic profile. 
•  to  implement,  audit  and  evaluate    multidisciplinary  teamwork  and  promote  it  as  a  realistic 
alternative to the historically exhausted, politically autocratic and epistemologicaly inappropriate 
doctor-centred paradigm. 
•  to provide multidisciplinary education at under-and postgraduate level. 
 
Needs assessment, continuity of care, home care, community-based health promotion activities are 
some  characteristic  examples  of  actions  taken  by  the  multidisciplinary  team  that  ensure  solid 
relationships with the local population and enhance the perspective of social involvement.
(11) The every 
day work of the Unit is reintroducing  social solidarity and empowerement. 
The resulting  political proof that high quality primary health care services can be provided by  local 
authorities  structures  is  gradually  producing  a  new  set  of  social  values  and  beliefs  in  the  local 
community, opposing the nowdays prevailing market ideology.   30
 
Dealing  with  specific  problems  of  the  local  community  enhances  the  active  involvement  of  the 
population in decision making. This process is leading to the development of a grassroots movement  
for health mobilised with concrete actions for equity and solidarity. 
 
The experience already gained from this project is showing that community involvement in health 
policy is feasible and could have an important impact in building up new social alliances readressing 
the need for equity in health and health services provision. 
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THE “FREEDOM OF CHOICE” IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PRIVATISATION OF 
THE COSTS IN THE ITALIAN CONTEXT 
 
Lorenzo Terranova 
 
One  of  the  reasons  of  the  victory  of  the  Italian  centre-left  wing  coalition,  the  Ulivo,  in  the  1996 
elections  was  the  awareness  that  the  reform  of  the  Welfare  State  could  not  be  left  to  the  Italian 
conservative and moderate forces.  In Prodi’s government programme (the first one including the PDS 
and backed by Rifondazione Comunista
1) the launching of a Welfare State reform was one of priorities.  
It finally seemed that the analysis and debate on the country’s decisions would be a substantial and 
overall review of the whole welfare system, instead of circumscribed interventions limited to a few 
sub-systems. 
 
The debate on health is representative of a broader issue: the logic of the interventions during the last 
ten  years  followed  exclusively  a  financial  approach  that  was  simply  aimed  towards  implementing 
savings (by reducing expenses or increasing revenues). 
 
This paper intends to promote considerations on how and why the aims of the Italian national health 
service (SSN) were not fulfilled or were found lacking (to an extent that SSN is characterised by a 
privatisation process), and the ensuing risks. 
 
The left-wing’s challenge in the health field is to set down proposals without incurring in the neo-
liberal solutions that characterise health in Europe.  I believe that the health expenses transfer from the 
public area to the private one may be opposed by reviewing the productive processes and especially the 
work  process.    Free  traders had  their  work  cut  out  for  them  stating  that  the  final  product  can  be 
improved by the privatisation of production, countering inefficiency.  During recent years the left-wing 
was not ready to face this challenge and retreated into conservative positions.  This approach can also 
be ascribed to the trade union’s role that proclaimed the needs of health workers above all, and did not 
help the left promote citizens’ new needs.  To stand up efficiently to the neo-liberal position, the left 
has had to abandon the ideological barriers preventing it from facing work re-organisation.  In fact, 
only the left will be able to guarantee satisfactory conditions for health workers that could otherwise 
not be vouched for. 
 
“Productivity”, “correspondence” and “inexpensiveness” are passwords that must take into account the 
so-called  problem  of  “excess  of  demand”:  with  the  increase  in  health  demand  (in  relation  also  to 
demographic trends) committed resources compete at a macro level with the new reallocation needs.  
The contrast between “financial limits” and “health rights” has to be resolved.  It implies that new 
compatibility relations between ethics and economics, between rights and interests and between health 
and development, have to be defined. 
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It is of importance for the future, in order to reintroduce a social pact, to point out solutions that may 
take on both economic and ethical issues without giving up obligations towards citizenship and social 
justice. 
 
It is in a health system restructuring frame that the need arises to consider the relation between ethics 
and economics, two values that have to become compatible.  Consequently, all the reference values 
involved in health system evolution have to be checked: 
 
1.  the reform of the Welfare State implies passing from the principle of access equality to outcome 
equality, which then has to be followed by a review of the whole in terms of performance quality, 
its utility and its opportunity; 
2.  the  universality  principle  of  the  national  health  service  (SSN),  in  a  quality  sense,  requires  the 
utility/opportunity combination to become specific and selective; 
3.  a mechanism combining utility and opportunity combination implies considering the operational 
modes that are implicit in the equality notion; a relationship between needs and individual resources 
has to be defined, as territorially-based criteria are no longer sufficient; 
4.  a personalisation of the utility/opportunity combination implies considering the operational modes 
that are implicit in the equality notion; a relationship between needs and individual resources has to 
be defined, as territorially-based criteria are no longer sufficient; 
5.  outcome equality and the individual needs/resources relationship require a new funding system that 
has to fit into a set of safeguards guaranteeing universality and personalisation, citizenship and 
solidarity. 
 
Consequently,  for  compatibility  reasons  between  ethics  and  economics,  against  a  framework  of 
productivity, correspondence and inexpensiveness, the restructuring process implies: 
 
•  reviewing guarantees; 
•  equality of possibility; 
•  straightening out welfare; 
•  broadening individual opportunities; 
•  equal starting conditions. 
 
Compatibility between ethics and economics has to have a new equality principle, a redefinition of the 
criteria of distributive (economics) justice (ethics). 
 
There  should  no  longer  be  an  offer  of  welfare  services  available  only  because  of  legal  right,  but 
conditions should allow free choice to individuals, without resulting in unequal starting conditions. 
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The implications of this position are extremely interesting.  At last some market forces will be less 
restricted  by  public  regulation.    They  will  be  able  to  operate  with  improved  efficiency  and 
effectiveness, offering goods and services which will, however, be guaranteed by the public body. 
 
Reconsidering equality in the health sector  means going from “general  universalism” to “selective 
universalism”.  This would mean a change from residual health care welfare (situation in which a series 
of services are offered to everyone), to market health care welfare (in which the buying power of the 
weak is enhanced without discouraging social consumption of others). 
 
This does not particularly support the idea of a “minimum state” as it adds strength to the change from 
a system based on formal right to a system based on “substantial” right.  It is not sufficient to access 
services,  results  must  be  obtained  from  accessing.    It  is,  in  fact,  the  passing  from  a  universalism 
understood as “access equality” to one understood as “result equality”.  The allocation of utilities and 
opportunities and the process of personalisation of performances imply that a new equity would bring 
about a thorough restructuring of health care together with a fine tuning of fair co-payment. 
 
Having taken into account the conceptual apparatus of analysis, a very important aspect has to be 
underlined.  I believe it represents a fundamental preamble that has never been faced in debates by 
reformist political parties.  With regard to privatisation of a health system, there may be two meanings 
(refer to tab.1 and 2): 
 
a)  transferring  a  series  of  costs  which  were  originally  shared  out  jointly  and  severally  among  all 
citizens, to those who actually sustained them; 
b)   changing of the contractual modalities of health operators. 
 
In this paper the privatisation notion implies avoiding burdening some weak categories with a series of 
costs.  Indeed, the income positions of some professional categories (I am referring to health personnel) 
-  do  not  simplify  the  processes  of  health  intervention.    Actually,  in  Italy  a  part  of  the  health 
privatisation process (meaning a shifting of costs which were once shared jointly and severally and 
which are now increasingly sustained by citizens) may be explained by the on-privatisation of the 
health care providers’ work relations. 
 
A brief history may be useful.  The 1978 reform radically changed the modalities of health offer by 
making health services available to all.  The problem that characterised this change is the failure to link 
the  responsibility  expenses  (the  Treasury  and  the  Parliament)  and  the  decisions  about  expenses 
(implemented  by  the  Regions).    In  this  frame,  and  to  answer  the  relevant  political  and  patronage 
requests, the Italian health model was characterised by the unproductiveness of the work itself, more 
than by the high number of SSN employees (and by the health providers’ productivity).  The core of the 
SSN problem (that was then reflected both by the financial side and by the public’s appreciation) was   34
not to reconsider work in a dynamic way, rendering it effective and functional to citizens, more than to 
those working in it. 
 
The Italian Legislative Decrees 502 and 517, approved in a new phase of State reform, ushered in a 
deep change.  They allowed for a freedom at the margin to introduce a change in health service work.  
The decrees are starting points that clearly have to be supplemented with normative instruments and 
regional implementations.  The issues tackled in the decrees are considerable ones that may be defined 
as: 
 
a)  aims and strategies to be adopted so that civil growth and health protection are guaranteed to the 
entire national community.  (The planning issue); 
b)   power systems in health decisions.  The director general’s issue and the management’s in particular; 
c)  company-like health organisation systems.  (The hospital and the Local Health Unit (former USL 
now ASL) issue, they offer modality); 
d)   minimum assistance levels and health funding systems.  (The financial resources issue); 
e)  Providers and their training.  (The human resources issue). 
 
This document will consider each of these issues.  It is clear though, that the management and human 
resources issues are the major ones, even more so as 50% of health expenses are in those fields (refer to 
tab. 3). 
 
However, setting aside the 1992/93 reform, the intervention consisted of limiting expenses by setting 
more or less strict ceilings.  For instance, the ceiling set for medical personnel belonging to hospitals 
during the three year period 1994/96; the contract had expired in 1994 and was initialled only a few 
weeks before the 1996 elections. 
 
Furthermore, the repeated making-good of the balance deficit (recently with the law 21/1997) clearly 
stresses that the ceiling control method is effective only if the collection role (funding of the system) 
and the expenses role are undertaken by a single actor (the Region).  Actually, the first results deriving 
from  the  modified  behaviour  of  central  authorities  seem  to  offer  positive  outcomes.    The  greater 
financial power of the Region through contributory incomes and road surtax) and a greater funding 
defined  by  the  Parliament  (the  national  health  fund,  FSN,  which  used  to  be  a  ridiculously  small 
amount) have reduced the deficit.  Do note that the general report on the country’s economic situation 
(“Ralazione generale sulla situazione economica del Paese”) states that last year (1996) the balance 
deficit between public health expenses and its funding was of 3,134 billion of lira.  Public health 
expenditure represents only 5.4% of the GDP, which is much lower than other E.U. countries. 
 
Without judging the distribution of public and private health expenses, it has to be noted that the 
ceiling method will be inefficient unless there is an intervention in the production phase of the flow   35
itself.  This would mean intervening on the productivity of the elements used, and mainly on the work 
element. 
 
In other words, cost-containment intervention is characterised by cuts in resources, leaving productivity 
virtually untouched.  The underlying (incorrect) hypothesis was that the secondary effect (indirect) of 
setting expenses ceilings would have been a productivity increase.  In the Italian instance there was a 
reduction of available funds (amongst others, productivity funds
2) without, however, reviewing the 
organisation in order to improve productivity. 
 
The most recent data from the general report on the country’s economic situation show a constant 
growth in staff expenses (in terms of ratio increase it is not the main cost, but it did absorb 43.2% of all 
the public health expenses in 1996.
3 
 
However, even if the ceiling setting mechanism is operative over a one or two-year period, by itself it 
will not tackle the productivity/growth issue because it does not influence the organisation of goods 
and allocation of services. 
 
The work factor issue has then to be viewed differently. 
 
Unproductive performances and their inappropriateness are based upon the lack of an organisational 
model of work, incapable of adapting to the evolution of the health care model and to the growing 
complexity of needs. 
 
It has to be said that work in the health area is managed more or less at the operators’ discretion 
(doctors,  administrators,  paramedics,  etc.).    This  leads  to  an  information  asymmetry;  there  is  no 
encounter on a “equal basis” between those offering health services (hospitals, surgeries and doctors) 
and those requesting it (citizens). 
 
The information asymmetry issue in the health market has different meanings dependent on the model 
used. 
 
There is the “agency relation model” where it is assumed that the doctor (agent or mandatory) allows 
for choices between  various  possibilities on behalf of the patient (principal or  mandator).  In this 
context the agent’s utility functions may not coincide with the mandator’s utility function (as it is often 
the case).  In this case there is a situation of “second best” choice.  Faced with these asymmetries, the 
health system reacts by setting a series of incentives/punishments for its agents (a typical example is 
the basic budget for GPs).  The intervention is focused on the control of whoever has information and 
not on its greater transparency (and spreading). 
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At a system level, and in this case I am referring to hospitals, this relation becomes a collectivisation of 
the patient (mandator)/doctors (agents link.  More specifically, knowledge or information is shared out 
jointly and severally between agents in order to stress the distance with the patient.  Knowledge is not 
passed  on  to  the  patient;  indeed  it  often  happens  that  the  use  of  technical  terms  and  behaviours 
increases  the  doctor/patient  gap.    In  this  (team)  model  there  is  a  connection  between  each  utility 
function of the agent; these functions belong to the hierarchical structure, or rather to the power in the 
team (so the utility function of the head physician is greater than the assistants’, but all the functions 
are compromises in perpetual balance).  The health system’s reaction in this case is to try and define 
instruments such as, for instance, DRGs that bind the agents’ utility function. 
 
However, the issue is linked to the increase in knowledge (and consequently in contractual power) of 
the patients in order to bind increasingly the agents.
4 
 
Furthermore, health (from the micro level to the macro one) is managed at the providers’ discretion 
(doctors, administrators, paramedics, etc.).  Most of the work is carried out by operators in a frame in 
which the demand does not meet the logic of a competitive market.   
 
It is in this frame that there is a daily confrontation between users (who request services) and operators 
(who offer them), expressed as a difference between what should be done (on the basis of bonds that 
are mainly normative ones) and what is done (to meet the requests).  This asymmetry is absorbed by 
the health provider who has to set modalities of provision that meet the citizen’s requests in quite a 
strict normative and contractual context.  It is during this phase that there is a productivity loss, both of 
the work factor and of other productive factors.  For instance, should there be a relevant mechanisation 
of laboratory work, in order to have an efficient and quasi-continuous work cycle, workers ought to 
operate all day.  This would imply a diversified use of their time and activities.  The health provider 
takes on the difference as he has to give concrete answers to the citizen’s requests, in a context set by 
regulations or by a strict contractuality.  How can this lack of co-ordination, that breeds the citizen’s 
discontent towards the SSN be overcome?
5 
 
I believe there are two options (that do not contrast): 
 
a)  decentralise work government; 
b)   promote interventions by new actors (for instance, a new definition of the role of local bodies) 
capable of spurring behaviours adapted to the specificity of the operational reality, reducing the 
organisational habits established by the centre. 
 
On the whole, a stock of minimum rules set by the centre has to be picked out and organisational 
models  -  meeting  and  defending  the  specific  needs  of  the  structure
6  -  ought  to  be  experimentally 
grafted onto them.  It actually would mean leaving intact the tayloristic model within the health system 
(with professional profiles, job descriptions, etc.).   37
This would result in a different responsibility of the worker; the provider would actually undertake 
some functions which are currently carried out by the organisation. 
 
The above implies both a restructuration of the wage system and of the flexibility of the work tasks: 
 
•  it is necessary to pass from a salary conception that is mostly independent from what is actually 
done, to a salary related to results; 
•  all payment systems that are independent from work (per capita payment, by the hour payment, 
integrated salary scheme) have to be replaced; 
•  the guaranteed minimum salary rate has to be reduced, balancing it against an ever-growing salary 
to be defined with the service, and decentralising therefore growing rates of variable wages; 
•  the regulation system superintending the professional salary framework has to be restructured; 
The professional profile may only be a reference scheme describing the minimum qualifications 
needed to carry out specific tasks.  At the same time it has to have a wide mesh that encourages 
professional  versatility,  functional  mobility,  integrated  interdiscipline,  department  and  district 
separation of work; 
•  It is suggested the reference professional profile should be placed with an “operational protocol”, 
applying the profile in well-defined organised contexts, in relation to clear aims and together with 
specific compensation forms; 
•  work relation must absolutely be redefined, it has to relate to flexible budgets and to the role of the 
collective contract, which also has to be reviewed by coupling it with proper individual contracts 
similar to company ones, supported by an efficient incentive system; 
•  in the event of experimental self-governing management of services, the relevant rules defining 
compensation have to be set; 
•  the turnover freeze is an operational instrument; mobility from the hospital to the community must 
be encouraged. 
 
It is only by serious consideration on work that important health reforms can be set up, that do not 
damage the citizen and do not involve a simple shift of costs to families. 
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Public and private expenditure in the health care sector 
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A CRITICAL VIEW OF GLOBAL BUDGETING IN GERMANY'S SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
SYSTEM 
 
Hagen Kühn 
 
Introduction 
 
 
I once suggested that some form of budgeting  would be politically  unavoidable in Germany's social  health 
insurance system. Within the framework of this assumption I am now arguing against global budgeting in the 
form of prospective stipulation of the maximum contribution rate and am instead advocating a flexible budget 
that is not designed for the short term but the medium term, is not global but specific to fractions of the system 
and  regions,  and  is  oriented  to  needs  and  results.  Such  a  budget  –  if  thoroughly  integrated  -  would  be  an 
expression of health and social policy responsibility on the part of a democratic state. 
 
For brevity's sake I would like to point out a number of unintentional consequences inherent in the form of 
global budgeting through "contribution-rate stability". 
 
 
Global budgeting: "stability of contribution rates" 
 
Among the many possible forms of 'budgeting' in the health system, the principle of 'contribution rate stability' is 
anchored in law in Germany, although it has never yet been strictly realized. It states that the financial volume of 
the  social  health  insurance  system  is  permitted  to  rise  together  with  the  wages  on  which  contributions  are 
imposed.  In  rough  terms  that  means:  the  growth  of  expenditures  must  be  adjusted  to  the  growth  of  the 
contributory payroll total. 
 
Legitimation ("cost explosion"?) 
 
Let us take a brief look at the empirical knowledge we have about the expenditures or "costs" of the social health 
insurance system: as table 1 shows, the percentage of the gross national product spent by Germans on the health 
system (HS) or social health insurance (SHI) has remained nearly constant since the end of the 70s. If five-year 
averages are taken, because of cyclical fluctuations, the result is that while an average of 5.74% of the GNP was 
spent on SHI between 1975 and 1980, it was 5.73% in the five years from 1989 to 1993. In that case, why all the 
excitement? 
 
The excitement - which, by the way, stems less from the insured persons than from employers and economics 
professors - is due to rising contribution rates. The annual average contribution rate for SHI rose from 8.2% in 
1970 to 11.4% (1980) and 13.41% in 1993. The contribution rates fluctuate with the economic cycle in as much 
as  the  revenues  have  periodically  deteriorated  in  proportion  to  the  expenditures,  which  then  provokes  a 
respective cost-control act as the government reaction. The dynamics thus clearly originate on the revenues side. 
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How can the contribution rates rise, however, when the percentage of social wealth spent on the 
health system remains constant? Only in as much as the revenues drop: 
 
 
 
Table 1: Share of the national income from dependent work (wages and salaries); Expenditures of medical 
care and of the social health insurance system as percentages of the gross national product, (former West 
Germany)  
 
Year     ANQ    BLQ    BBLQ    BNLQ    GW    GKV 
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1960    77,0    60,1    65,0    47,3    -    - 
1970    83,4    68,0    68,0    45,0    -    3,53 
1975    86,0    74,2    71,9    43,8    -    5,66 
1980    88,3    75,8    71,6    41,2    8,4    5,82 
 
1981    88,4    76,8    72,4    42,3    -    5,99 
1982    88,4    76,9    72,5    42,2    -    5,83 
1983    88,4    74,6    70,4    40,2    -    5,72 
1984    88,4    73,4    69,2    38,9    -    5,67 
1985    88,7    73,0    68,6    38,2    8,7    5,93 
1986    88,6    72,1    67,8    37,8    8,6    5,89 
1987    88,8    72,6    68,1    37,6    8,7    5,94 
1988    89,0    71,5    67,0    37,1    8,8    6,07 
1989    89,1    70,3    65,8    36,1    8,3    5,69 
1990    89,4    69,6    64,9    36,6    8,3    5,48 
1991    89,5    69,6    64,8    35,5    8,4    5,68 
1992    89,6    70,7*    65,8*    35,4*    8,7    5,95 
1993    89,4    72,1*    67,2*    36,1*    -    5,84* 
__________________________________________________________________ 
(1) ANQ: Percentage of employees among persons in gainful employment  
(2) BLQ: Share of the national income from dependent work (wages and salaries) (including 'employers actual 
and imputed social contributions')  
(3) BBRQ: labor's adjusted gross share, ANQ = 1970 
(4) BNLQ: labor's adjusted net share (BLQ without wage taxes and employee's actual social contributions but 
including 'employers actual and imputed social contributions') ANQ = 1970 (5) Health system expenditure as a 
percentage of gross national product (GNP) 
(6) GKV: Social health insurance system's expenditures as a percentage of GNP 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Eigene Berechnung n. (1)-(4):Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung 1994/95, BT-Drucksache 13/26, p.345, 353; (5) Schieber, G.J./ Poullier, J.-P./ Greenwald, L.M.: 
Health System Performance in OECD Countries, Health Affairs, Fall 1994, p.101; (6) Sachverständigenrat der 
Konzertierten Aktion im Gesundheitswesen, 1994, p.309 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
From table 1 it can be seen that the share of the national income
1 from dependent work, i.e. wages and salaries, 
has declined since the end of the 70s, with the 'income from entrepreneurial activities and assets' increasing 
correspondingly  thereto. 
 
Only during economic downturns is the chronologically delayed drop in wages briefly expressed in a rising 
share.  Compared  with  the  average  of  1975/80,  the  gross  share  accounted  for  by  wages  dropped  by  the 
quinquennium of 1989/93 from 75% to 70.46% of the national income. If the contemporary higher percentage of   41
employees among persons in gainful employment is taken into account with 'labor's adjusted gross share', the 
share of the national income accounted for by wages dropped from 71.75 to 65.7%. The deterioration of the 
employees' distribution situation is expressed even more clearly by labor's adjusted net share: it dropped from 
42.5% (1975/80) to 35.9% (1989/93). 
 
But where are the "additional" wage costs ("Lohn-Nebenkosten"), the heart of the legitimation for a restrictive 
policy? Is it really the case that they "eat up" this wage trend so welcome to the companies, thus invalidating it? 
To answer this question it would be sufficient for the experts and journalists who suggest this every day to risk a 
look  at  the  fine  print  in  the  statistics.  There  it  can  be  read  that  the  "employers'  actual  and  imputed  social 
contributions" are contained in the - declining! - gross share accounted for by wages (and even in the net share).
2 
The Federal Government also overlooks this in its "Industrial Location Report" ("Standortbericht") and adds the 
employers' contributions to the wage costs a second time.
3 Now, since the SHI is financed entirely from these 
contributions, there are, literally, no "additionals" any more in the gross payroll amount, the percentage of 
which is definitely not tending to rise but is declining. 
 
Result: while the percentage of the GNP accounted for by SHI has remained unchanged since 1975/80, the share 
of wages and salaries in the national income has dropped. If, therefore, the employment figures and labor's share 
had remained constant from the 80s until now, today's contribution rate would correspond exactly to that of 
1980. To put it another way: if the percentage of the national product accounted for by wages had risen, given 
the empirical trend in expenditures (i.e. the given 'cost explosion'!), the contribution rate would even have fallen. 
Thus, with the seemingly neutral linkage of financing to wage developments, fundamental decisions are in fact 
made that might not even be intended by many participants. 
 
 
What is decided with the precept of contribution stability? 
 
Very few of the people involved are aware of what social relationships and economic developments the medical 
and nursing care is linked to by this precept.
4  The main implications are the following: 
 
First: the coupling of state expenditures to "objectively" specified economic data is a method by which the 
financing is removed from democratic decision-making processes and controls.  
 
Second: the ostensible objectification of the mechanical link with the political economics of income distribution 
also conceals the fact that with such a method the extent and, in some respects, the quality of social-state services 
is even formally decoupled from social-policy objectives. 
 
Third: the total payroll (table 1), from which the contributions can be collected, is, in the end, the product of the 
wage level and the employment rate. Their level and growth therefore depend on the politico-economic balance 
of power between labor and capital or public employers and, to double extent, on the labor market. For one,   42
because  falling  employment  rates  directly  reduce  the  total  payroll  and,  for  another,  because  the  workforce 
"surplus" is the central mechanism with which a weakening of the labor unions and a relative lowering of the 
wage level "are pushed through" in industrialized market societies. The seemingly so objective principle of 
contribution rate stability now  imposes  market and power  mechanisms on the  wage  components  which are 
redistributed to the social health insurance system. 
 
Fourth: In every western industrialized country, and thus in Germany as well, it is above all the labor market, as 
the buyers' market, which indicates that the trend in the direction of a lower wage and salary ratio will continue. 
Society's  largest  service  sector  (i.e.  wage-intensive,  lower-than-average  productivity)  is  tied  to  a  declining 
macroeconomic variable. 
 
Fifth: once this context has been fixed in place and legitimized, all the control media inside the health system, 
i.e. the market, the legal system, professional norms and expertise, are used in such a way that they become 
transformation  mechanisms  which  see  to  it  that  the  macroeconomic  imperative  is  also  implemented  by  the 
institutional  decisions  made  in  the  doctor's  practice  and  hospital,  i.e.  executed  within  the  doctor-patient-
relationship. The more the patient innocently trusts that the physician will be acting as his agent and not as the 
agent of the institution and its "bottom-line", or of the state or a future generation
5, the smoother this takes place. 
This individual chance to find the help of a loyal doctor in the case of need is an individual opportunity for 
everyone, a "public good" which is at stake here. 
 
Finally - sixth - it is also necessary to point out a rarely noted property of budgeting strategies, the fact that they 
promote the 'monetary illusion'. That is to say, the flow of money and the control thereof is taken for the thing 
itself and replaces efforts to solve  the real structural problems of  health care. The budgeting ('capping') of 
doctors' fees, in which an undesirable expansion of volume beyond the specified growth rate (e.g. the revenues) 
is compensated for by a decline in point values for individual services, is exemplary of this illusion. Thus, for 
example, the expansion of volume in a panel doctor's district within a period of four years' time can lead to a 
point-value decline of 40%. The physicians have the same collective income they would have had without the 
expansion of volume. The "costs problem" therefore only appears to have been solved, for the resources (e.g. 40 
percent, i.e. two out of 5 weekdays of the doctor's working time) were used up in real terms and are therefore no 
longer  available  for  any  alternative  or  more  beneficial  use.  They  simply  were  not  paid  by  the  insurance 
institutions but by the suppliers themselves. 
 
Personal services 
 
The  personal  and  patient-related  services  with  far  above-average  labor-  and  wage-intensity  are  a  dilemma. 
Budgeting that is oriented in the long run to an unchanging percentage of the national product (or even to a 
declining wage and salary ratio) must entail in this case - i.e. in precisely those communicative types of services 
to be promoted - not stagnation but restraint. 
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Example: there are hardly any goods that can be compared with each other over an extended period of time. Let 
us therefore take an egg, as an agro-industrial product, and a man's haircut (MH), as a personal service. After the 
Federal Republic was formed, an egg probably cost about DM 0.20 and a MH about DM 2.50. If we take the DM 
of 1950 as being worth DM 0.25 today, then an egg at today's price of DM 0.40 cost DM 0.10 in the DM of 
1950. In real terms it is thus about fifty percent cheaper. The MH costs DM 25.00 today and has become about 
2.5 times more expensive. Thus, while a personal service cost 12.5 eggs in 1950, it costs 62.5 eggs today. The 
price ratio between the material product and the service has changed from 1 : 12.5 to 1 : 62.5. Let us assume an 
individual consumed five eggs a week in 1950 and went to the barber every two weeks. If this had been updated 
with the average inflation rate, today's budget  would permit consumption of twice the number of eggs (40 
instead of 20). But the trip to the barber would only be possible every five months instead of twice a month. The 
barbers would either lose (in real terms) four-fifths of their 1950 income or their number would have dropped to 
20 percent. The egg producers could employ just as many workers with double the productivity. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Only a few conclusions can be hinted at. In the given conditions it is important to find compromises between 
orientation to health,  social  and ethical  needs and the imperatives of the dominant political economy. That 
speaks against global budgeting (e.g. via a prospective setting of the maximum contribution rate) and for flexible 
budgeting that is not designed for the short term but the medium term, not global but specific to sections of the 
health care system  and regions (but thoroughly integrated). 
 
The extent and profile of the financing should be a distinct expression of the will that goes into the formulation 
of health policy, i.e. the result of transparent democratic decisions and not a schematic coupling of the financial 
latitude  to  macroeconomic  parameters  ("contribution  rate  stability"),  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
requirements of health and social policies. 
On the condition that inflation resulting from power-related prices and inefficiency can be kept as small as 
possible, a rising percentage of expenditures for socially desirable, personal services would be a downright 
positive expression of the overall economy's growth in productivity. For, the mass of material goods can be 
produced by an ever smaller work force due to constantly growing productivity. The economic precondition for 
expanding  and  improving  the  social-service  sectors  would  also  lie  precisely  in  the  growth  of  industrial 
productivity,  which today finds its ominous expression in, above all, mass unemployment and a surplus of 
material objects (e.g. waste). Since this applies to equal extent to all industrialized countries, the argument of the 
world market competition is especially superfluous. 
 
A budget should not be linked to the short-term development of growth and distribution but should be need-
related (i.e. apportionment of differing amounts of resources to individual sectors in accordance with health-
policy criteria), designed for the medium term and slightly higher than the growth curve of the GNP. A certain 
regionalization would likewise be advisable, but only if the regional financial volume is not tied to the economic   44
wealth of the region. Not only the macro-control by way of budgeting but also the economic and institutional 
microconditions  have  to  leave  room  for  the  extraeconomic  dimensions,  i.e.  the  health,  cultural  and  moral 
dimensions, of the health care system. This is precluded by the transformation of public service institutions into 
enterprises  acting  on  the  narrow-minded  basis  of  its  "bottom  line".  Moreover,  these  cultural  and  ethical 
dimensions are at risk, if those enterprises are subjected to the financial pressure of a global budget that is also 
oriented to a wage and salary share with a falling tendency in the foreseable future. Not only that. Even if the 
catalogue of SHI services remains completely intact, it is likely that the principle of solidarity will erode at the 
level of the services rendered.
6 
______________________________________________ 
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SOLIDARITY IN THE STATUTORY HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
Walter Baumann 
 
This paper reviews the scientific and political debate in Germany concerning benefits supplied by the statutory 
health insurance which are suspected to lack the so-called 'insurance-relationship'. The issue is addressed with 
special attention to the health care system, but it could be addressed in the same way for other branches of 
German social security organised through social insurance systems. 
 
All countries in Europe, whatever their systems of social security, face an ongoing rise in health expenditures. 
Tax-financed  health  systems  as  well  as  contribution-based  systems  are  constantly  looking  for  new  funding 
sources to meet the financial burden. In Germany today the politically-preferred solution of raising new funds is 
to increase co-payments in the statutory health insurance. 
 
However, increasingly our European neighbours do not base their financial resources for health care only upon 
contributions to health insurance systems. For example, in 1995 Spain assigned a certain amount of sales taxes to 
social security. The increase of value added tax was matched by a reduction in contribution rates. In a similar 
way Portugal has balanced its social insurance system. 
 
For some years now France has tapped new financial sources for health care by taxation, namely a tax on 
alcohol, one on advertising expenditures of the pharmaceutical industry, and others. Furthermore France has 
introduced the "contribution sociale generalisé", a kind of social-insurance-tax, which has to be paid on all forms 
of income, including investment profits.  
 
All  in  all,  we  see  many  attempts  in  many  countries  to  find  a  new  balance  in  health  care  between  public 
responsibilities, which are tax financed, social insurance systems and private care. There must be some good 
reasons to enlarge the tax-burden for financing social goods and services. Demographic changes, current mass-
unemployment and the apparently uncontrollable growth in demand and supply of health services all stress on 
the question, how to raise funds and how to bear the financial burden? 
 
 
 
TAX:       
 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL 
INSURANCE:     
 
PRIVATE INSURANCE    
PREMIUM: 
 
 
One-side obligation of payment 
without entitlement in return 
 
Obligation of payment with general 
entitlement to services in return  
 
Voluntary payment with 
definite counterpart in return 
 
 
 
German politicians have recognised the impact of health expenditures on occupation. The health market is a 
growing market and therefore policies may not be suitable which focus simply on cost-containment in health   46
care. That is why German politicians have changed their point of view during the last few months quite radically. 
The problems of control in the health care system, which seemed to be problems of cost and efficiency, have 
been redefined as problems of a sufficient revenue for health care. The main target is no longer higher efficiency 
in health care to make its costs tolerable, but improving its financial basis without a change in quality and 
structure of health care providers. 
 
There is a central dogma in German politics which is emphasised by nearly all political parties: the price of 
labour and capital may not be raised. To shift additional resources from private income into the health care 
system has therefore to be recognised as the main political objective. In this regard raising contributions to the 
social  health  insurance  is  perceived  as  making  labour  more  expensive  and  therefore  to  set  false  economic 
incentives. In this situation it is quite astonishing that the German government rejects all proposals to tap private 
income by additional taxation. Obviously the government is afraid of a growing middle-class-opposition against 
new tax-burdens which are believed to affect economic activities negatively. 
 
 
 
THE GERMAN SOCIAL INSURANCE SCEME 
 
INSURANCE CONDITIONS 
 
> contribution rate ~ 13,5 % up to a renumeration 
  of 6150 DM per month (assessment ceiling) 
  to bear half/half by employee/employer 
> no additional contribution for co-insured dependants 
 
SUPPLIED BENEFITS 
 
> health goods and services 
> monetary benefits (sickness allowance) 
 
 
 
In this state of affairs the number of influential people who demand a shift in financing insurance benefits from 
contribution to taxes has been growing. These demands are supported by all political colours, from left to right. 
First of all they emphasise the question what kind of benefits supplied by the statutory insurance systems should 
be financed by contributions, according to systematic criteria. It has been widely argued recently that various 
benefits lack any relationship whatsoever to insurance principles in the social insurance system. That is why, that 
these extraneous benefits have to be taken out of contribution-financed systems and be replaced by social goods 
supplied by public administration. 
 
The more left voices hope that the shift supports a mobilisation of additional public revenue for social security. 
On the one hand, social-democratic positions and forces for the insurance systems find themselves acting to   47
stabilise these systems. One the other hand, the conservatives count on the effect that some social benefits are 
removed without replacement, by this approach. Of course, the national budgets are in no way able to take over 
social duties corresponding to the amount of costs in question. The conservative target is in fact the neoliberal 
cure of a lean social security system. 
  
The issue of the benefits which are said to be not insurance related is based on the view that the government has 
followed political strategies of social reform using the social insurance systems and their contribution funds as 
instruments. It is argued that the government has used the social insurance system to perform public duties. In 
this  view,  the  current  problems  in  financing  seem  to  be  introduced  into  the  social  insurance  systems  from 
outside. The insurance systems were forced to bear social burdens which do not fit their genuine function. 
Consequently, all critics despite their political colour agree that it might be decided systematically which social 
goods have to be supplied by insurance funds and which do not. 
 
If you look at the benefits which are blamed for a lack of insurance relationship you find first of all those very 
closely aimed at the redistribution of  wealth.  It is a central objective of the statutory insurance system to 
facilitate social security for the less fortunate part of the population by burdening the more powerful shoulders 
with costs. From my point of view the principle of solidarity is the principle of redistribution of wealth. I would 
like to stress the point that solidarity does not mean risk compensation in the way every insurance is operating. 
 
In view of critics of social insurance systems, the redistribution of wealth has to be kept as a public obligation. 
There should be no separate statutory institution serving redistribution of wealth within the group of the insured. 
That is why these critics deny a specified function of solidarity within the social insurance system. They reject 
the idea that any ties of solidarity amongst the wage and salary earners should be created by insurance systems 
established as statutory institutions. In the above mentioned sense of redistribution, solidarity is defined as a 
fundamental national duty which has to include the whole society. 
 
Looking for criteria which typify the lack of insurance relationship in a very strict sense, you find yourself 
irritated very soon. It is not possible to select one benefit from others by obvious criteria. Even those who 
support this approach have to admit that the differences pointed out are quite arbitrary, although generally they 
believe that only insurance dealing with the current risk compensation can be regarded as a real insurance. In this 
strict  sense  the  German  statutory  health  insurance  is  evidently  no  kind  of  insurance.  Nevertheless,  the 
community of the insured compensates individual risks by bearing them collectively - and here there is no 
difference from private risk insurance funds, revealing the common historical origins of both. The statutory 
insurance system, however, does not create any equivalence of individually paid contributions and distributed 
benefits in favour of insured or risks. There is no contribution age grading, and no differentiation between males 
and females. The strongest characteristic of the statutory insurance system is the immediate and common bearing 
of  expenditures  without  accumulation  of  capital.  All  receipts  have  to  be  transformed  into  expenditures 
immediately.  
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PUBLIC      financed by taxes (public budget) 
BENEFITS:    direct control of politics 
        depending on budget situation 
        all citizens are entitled to claim benefits 
 
BENEFITS    financed by contributions (separate budget) 
OF SOCIAL    control of politics moderated by autonomous 
INSURANCE:       administrative board 
        insured are entitled to claim benefits 
 
 
 
Considering  the  statutory  insurance  schemes  in  their  historical  framework,  benefits  which  are  defined  as 
insurance related can be found from the beginning of the nineteenth century. The benefits that are now blamed 
nearly all constitute the birth certificate of this great achievement in social politics. In this regard, the social 
insurance funds have always been used as instruments of social policy in Germany. The political intention of the 
various governments and its political power have succeeded in turning social duties into social insurance duties. 
No more legitimatisation has been necessary. 
 
This is the reason why, nowadays, the range of social insurance benefits seems to be arbitrary.  However, it 
cannot be criticised without affecting the total statutory insurance system. Benefits of social insurance schemes 
represent, economically, merit goods. The recipients of these benefits are forced to join these insurance schemes, 
they are not able to shape their individual scope of available benefits and covered risks. 
 
The principle of the social insurance system is characterised by aspects of social assistance which have become 
more  and  more  significant  in  the  last  decade.  The  availability  of  insurance  benefits  has  been  gradually 
disconnected from preceding insurance and contributions obligations. These obligations no longer strictly define 
access, and do not determine the amount of available benefits.  
 
In statutory health insurance, it is the loss of significance which hits the so-called monetary benefits, especially 
the  sickness  allowance,  compared  to  goods  and  services  in  health  care.  Monetary  benefits  are  bound  to 
previously paid contributions. Health goods and services in the health insurance scheme are available for every 
covered person regardless of different contribution payments or periods. Therefore, health services and goods 
produce a stronger redistribution effect than monetary benefits. 
 
Furthermore the conditions for the availability of goods and services supplied by the social health insurance have 
been facilitated and extended in the last decades. The access to benefits in social insurance funds has been 
widely enlarged, whilst insurance period and amount of contribution have lost their functions as  barriers to 
benefits. On the one hand, more and more people have been entitled to claim benefits of the social health 
insurance. On the other hand contribution payment obligations have been kept in narrow limits. 
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Redistribution effects taking place within the social insurance system are no longer bound to a more or less 
homogeneous group, who bear the contributions and take the benefits. From this point of view - and only from 
this - it is correct to claim that some benefits are not insurance related within the statutory insurance system. But 
the number of such benefits is much lower than the range discussed before.  
 
 
 
BENEFITS WHICH ARE CRITICISED 
 
> no contribution for co insured dependants 
 
> benefits in case of pregnancy and maternity 
 
> monetary payment in case of death 
 
> benefits for birth control and contraception 
 
> benefits  in case of legal abortion 
 
> domestic help 
 
 
There is a connecting problem. It becomes more and more difficult to estimate the effects and the direction of 
redistribution. One is no more able to explain clearly, who receives solidarity from whom. It has to be assumed - 
for it can be proved - that the more wealthy groups of insured are subsidised by the less wealthy. But the fact that 
redistribution does not  work as it  was initially intended, is no argument against redistribution in the social 
insurance system in general. 
 
The social insurance scheme is losing legitimacy in the public eye.  Solidarity within the system is no longer 
clearly noticed by those who shall participate in it.  There is the risk of a decline in solidarity as a central issue in 
the social insurance system.  The trust in and the ties of  the clients to the autonomous insurance funds are 
weakening. These connections to the clients have worked quite successfully up to now. If they fail to work, the 
risks for the future and their stability of social insurance systems will increase. 
 
In  summary:  From  my  point  of  view,  there  is  no  basis  for  talking  about  benefits  which  lack  insurance 
relationship within a social insurance system. They simply do not exist, because a statutory insurance systems 
does not work like a private risk insurance. Even when done with best intention, the demand to remove benefits 
from this system no way supports the struggle for a new balance in the financing of social insurance systems.  
Rather, it destroys its fundamental principles. 
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MODELLING HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN FORMER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
 
Rolf Rosenbrock 
 
Introduction and Methods 
 
My personal background in respect to the topic is the fact that after some 20 years of research and policy advice 
regarding the framing, institution building, steering and financing of prevention, health care and social security 
in well-off industrialised countries I was given the opportunity to conduct five short studies in Baltic and central 
Asian countries in the course of the last two years.  These short studies involved not only the analysis of far more 
than 100 interviews with experts and actors but also the organisation, attendance at and observation of seminars.  
The studies applied to the situation and development of health policy in the countries as well as to the forms and 
effectiveness of international cooperation in this area. 
 
Two questions therefore suggest themselves: 
 
1.  To  what  extent  are  the  models,  behavioural  expectations  and  mixture  of  regulations  stemming  from 
functioning health-care and financing systems in the west applicable to the cultural, political and economic 
conditions of the formerly Leninist/socialist countries? 
 
2.  What fostering and impeding roles are played by different forms of international technical cooperation in the 
development of independent and purposeful health policy in the partner countries? 
 
Results 
 
To answer this question it is necessary to take a short look at the initial health-policy situations.  Until the end of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 these countries had a well-developed health-care system in terms of institutions and 
personnel, a system that provided, all in all, ubiquitous, population-wide, free and indiscriminate access to all 
available health-care services far above the global average.
(1)  The system was planned, financed and steered in 
centralised fashion.  The control mechanisms favoured quantitative over qualitative growth.  Priority orientation 
to the meeting of formal targets instead of producing results led at every stage of administration and health care 
to  a  tendency  to  inefficiency.    Furthermore,  these  mechanisms  also  led  to  over-medicalisation  due  to  an 
excessive  consolidation  of  specialist  over  general  care  and  inpatient  over  outpatient  treatment.    By  today’s 
standards  the  care  was  too  physician-centred:  the  relationship  with  the  patients  was  one  based  more  on 
paternalism than partnership, and nursing had not yet emancipated itself from its role as a medical assistant’s 
profession.  Social workers and public health nurses were virtually unknown.  Public health and prevention 
followed  -  in  very  strong  institutional  terms  -  a  paradigm  restricted  to  safety  and  technical  hygiene.  
Enlightenment and health education followed what tended to be traditional pedagogical concepts.  There could 
hardly  be  any  talk  of  implementation  of  the  WHO  declarations,  above  all  the  Ottawa  Charter  on  health 
promotion, that were supported basically in state-centralised declamatory fashion.
(2) 
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The first five years of independence brought these countries not only their dramatic economic crises, the depth of 
which  was  unforeseen  by  the  public,  but  also  a  massive  decline  in  health,  with  a  drop  in  the  average  life 
expectancy of as much as one and a half years.
(3)  The main reasons for this are the precipitate fall of broad 
sectors  of  the  population  into  unprecedented  unemployment  and  poverty,  the  decay  of  social  cohesion  and 
perspectives, the rapid expansion of material and social inequality, the increase in legal and illegal drugs as well 
as accidents, suicides and violent crime.  Even the best health policy can compensate for this stark deterioration 
of  an  epidemiological  effective  balance  of  risks  and  resources  to  only  a  slight  but,  on  the  other  hand,  not 
inconsiderable degree. 
 
The medical-care system of these countries functions astoundingly well despite the often month-long absence of 
state funds for the payment of the very low salaries as well as for materials and repairs, and despite the collapse 
of formerly obligatory continuing education.  Professionalism and professional moral are usually very marked.  
Largely unsolved are problems involving import controls, approval and pricing as well as eradication of the 
black market for drugs.  The feldsher stations that in terms of their approach were very suitable for primary 
health care in the countryside are presently disappearing, probably irrevocably: they are the last link in the still 
primarily centrally organised financing chain.  Physicians who have become unemployed due to the incipient but 
usually dawdling reduction of capacities in the upper tiers of medical-care are pushing into this health-care stage  
All in all, the health-care system will have to make do with, in most cases, a maximum of one-third of the 
resources it used to be accustomed to, while, however, continuing to meet in full its obligations to the overall 
population - as prescribed by the constitution, laws and professional ethics.  To put it briefly: the formerly 
socialist countries are facing the complex task of maintaining, on a population-wide basis, a physician-centred, 
top-heavy and inefficiently steered health-care system with too much capacity within a dramatically shrunken 
framework of resources while modernising it at the same time from the bottom up.  That is indeed a titanic task 
for the performance of which there are no historic models.
(4) 
 
As regards the goal, it is possible to see, despite many national differences, a core stock of common conceptions 
that come down to a combination of system components viewed as exemplary all over the world and which - 
with a few adjustments - are compatible with each other: reorientation of outpatient care to primary health-care 
structures, with special attention being paid to family medicine and professional nursing, aims at implementation 
of the WHO declaration of Alma Ata (1977) and thus, more or less, at an adoption of concepts from, above all, 
Great  Britain  (general  practitioners),  Scandinavia  and  the  USA  (professional  nursing).    Plans  for  the 
development of a system of prevention and health promotion are oriented to WHO principles and the worldwide 
attempts at their implementation and institutionalisation.  Models are seen above all in Canada and Scandinavia.  
A selective reduction in differentiation of medical-care capacities in, primarily, the inpatient sector can fall back 
on models - with a less dramatic history - in numerous industrialised countries in the eighties.  The computerised 
mapping of illness, medical-care and financing events as a steering tool has produced the greatest abundance of 
positive  and  negative  experiences  in  the  USA.    Debates  about  and  experiments  with  efficiency-promoting 
incentive systems are to be found all over the world, the most advance and successful ones presumably in 
Canada  and  Scandinavia.    The  development  of  sources  and  administrative  forms  of  financing  outside  the 
centralised state tax budgets, but also over and beyond private maximisation strategies via the market, can fall 
back on central European experiences.  German experience is especially in demand here, because most of the   52
transformation  countries  are  programmatically  pursuing  the  idea  of  statutory  health  insurance  and  are  also 
calling for elements of co-determination on the part of social forces (capital and labour).
(5)   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the perspective of these concepts lies the creation of a modern, efficient, learn and affordable system for the 
social management of health risks prior to and after their occurrence.  Knowledge of the professional, technical 
and qualificatory conditions for the creation and steering of these system components as well as knowledge of 
their  desirable  and  undesirable  effects  is  available  internationally  and  can  be  mobilised  by  international 
cooperation.  The central problem therefore lies - as is usual in politics - less in the finding of concepts and the 
specification of goals than in the question of how movement in the direction of the desired target situation can be 
organised starting from the current state of affairs.  On the basis of my observations both the national actors and 
international  consultants  regularly  make  several  fundamental  miscalculations  in  respect  to  fostering  and 
impeding conditions for the desired developments.  The lasting success of reform efforts will depend on the 
correction of these miscalculations. 
 
Central deficits in the transformation countries, their governments and administrations are, above all: 
 
 
•  Broad  sectors  of  the  population  as  well  as  many  health-care  professionals,  administrators  and  decision-
makers lack a basic understanding of social and health policy in differentiated and pluralistic societies.  In the 
areas of qualification and social marketing it is therefore necessary to impart to greater extent concepts of 
risk-pooling, risk-sharing, risk-compensation, institutionalised solidarity and institutionalised solidarity and 
institutional division of tasks. 
 
•  A problem that goes beyond the area of health policy is how to impart concepts and practical knowledge of 
client and outcome orientation in contrast to handed-down concepts centred on the meeting of formal targets.  
In some cases that will involve years of learning processes that cannot be mastered in a few seminars but 
only as a long-term task. 
(6) 
 
•  The health system in the Soviet Union was officially steered with the tools of qualification, moral suasion, 
professional  reputation  and  material  incentives  for  the  meeting  of  formal  targets.    Informally,  political 
conformism was also honoured, and there was everyday corruption.
(7)   The development and implementation 
of new mixtures of moral and material incentives for orientation to health-related results are required.
(4)  
 
•  The political and ideological turnabout has led to deep insecurity on the part of the health-policy actors.  
Officially, nearly all the tools of state control and administration have been discredited, and complementary 
thereto the appropriateness and efficacy of private and primarily market-controlled incentive systems are 
overestimated.
(8,9)    Unofficially,  many  decision-makers  have  a  deep  distrust  of  non-state  control.    This   53
ambiguity can only be overcome with careful and unprejudiced qualification in respect to both the desirable 
and undesirable effects of state, parastate, mixed and private-enterprise systems of control and incentive. 
 
•  The development and pursuance of strategic orientation and objectives with long-term effectiveness have to 
take place in the transformation countries at the same time as daily crisis management.  It is often extremely 
difficult to reconcile the different logics and time horizons of these two task areas with each other so that, on 
the one hand, they can respectively dealt with as relatively independent entities while, on the other, keeping 
crisis management from being handled with tools that would block the developments desired in the long 
term. 
 
•  There are often considerable reservations about applying models for the control and financing of health care, 
e.g. by way of social insurance patterned on the German system, because this model is felt to be unattainably 
differentiated, perfect and expensive.  In this conjunction the fact is overlooked that Bismarck’s model was 
likewise introduced in times of severe economic crisis against the resistance of physicians and the insured 
parties, and initially only as partial insurance against illness-related loss of pay. 
(10)  Knowledge of social and 
political processes
(11) as well as the setting of strategic courses for the introduction and development of new 
models  and  institutions  of  social  security  are  therefore  essential  for  decision-makers  in  transformation 
countries. 
 
•  The poverty of broad sectors of the population as well as considerable shortcomings in the control of taxes 
and contributions make it impossible to completely convert, in the short term, the health-care system to 
financing by contributions from the insured parties and enterprises.  On the other hand, independence of the 
financing from the state budget and the inclusion of enterprises and insured persons as the financiers and 
parties responsible for health and social policy are important goals.  Approaches in which are initially small 
but, in terms of perspective, growing part of the expenses are financed by contributions, the state budget 
being accordingly relieved, would appear to be promising. 
 
•  Concepts  involving  partial  privatisation  of  the  financing  of  and  responsibility  for  health  care  regularly 
envisage  a  transfer  of  important  functions  to  representatives  of  the  enterprises  and  employees,  usually 
represented by employers’ associations and trade unions.  In most transformation countries these actors have 
not yet adequately consolidated their position.  The actor gap
(12) this entails is, in part, an invitation to the 
creation of fictitious solutions and, in part - given a strong ideological discrediting of state control - to an 
uncritical  surrender  of  financing  and  medical-care  functions  to  market  forces.    The  laborious  path  of 
simultaneous development and qualification on non-state, social-policy actors “on the job” is required. 
 
  From this complex problem situation there follow six matters for international technical cooperation and 
political consultation: 
 
•  The dominant orientation of projects of international cooperation to a transfer of technology and control 
know-how requires underpinning by social and health-policy qualifications in which the productive social 
power of equity, socially organised solidarity and client orientation is imparted.   54
 
•  Projects  involving  technical  cooperation  mostly  tend  to  see  the  institutions  and  human  resources  in  the 
transformation countries as raw material for the construction of western financing and control models.
(13)  But 
the mostly habitualised experiences with not only the Soviet type of care but also with the phase of radical 
change to date are not taken into adequate account either as fostering or as impeding conditions for the 
development of new views and the erection of new structures. 
 
•  The aforementioned problems as well as further problems involving a reorganisation of social and health 
policies can only be overcome in interactive processes with the partners in the transformation countries.  The 
still prevalent practice of dispatching experts for a short time usually does not help and is based on an 
overestimation of the political and guiding effects resulting from experts’ reports and seminars. 
 
•  The remodelling of the health system is only in part a central state task.  Projects involving international 
cooperation will have to work in an even-handed way with NGOs, medical and nursing associations as well 
as employers’ associations and trade unions and/or will have to support their growth. 
 
•  International cooperation can only start at exemplary points in the complex field of health-policy actors, 
problems and developments.  For the indentification of suitable points of intervention it is necessary to apply 
criteria of strategic relevance, sustainability, synergy, freedom from contradictions and cultural compatibility. 
 
•  Combining and coordinating international cooperation in country-specific programmes, e.g. under the aegis 
of WHO, can help to focus strengths and cut frictions.  But some of these combined projects are too complex 
and  too  rigidly  interconnected.    This  is  often  due  to  an  underestimation  of  the  complexity  and 
unpredictability  of  intervention  in  social  systems,  which  are  not,  after  all,  trivial  machines  with  clearly 
predictable input-output relations, there being no “one best way” to reorganise them.  
(14,15) 
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ASYLUM SEEKERS, REFUGEES AND HEALTH 
- THE SITUATION IN DIFFERENT WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
H.-Jochen Zenker, Zahra  Mohammadzadeh, Thomas Hilbert 
 
Although by the mid-nineties foreign migrants accounted for more than 8 per cent of the total population in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, there is still a definite lack of public recognition of this development and its 
consequences. Nor has official political discourse on social and health issues so far addressed the real situation 
of migrants in this country, neither has it been made a subject of public health or social needs research.  
 
Up to the seventies so-called ‘guest workers’ who had been hired in Southern Europe and Turkey were rather 
naively expected to return to their home countries in due time, definitely after having retired from working life. 
As the years went on, however, politicians not only had to accept the immigrants’ desire to stay, but had to face 
the fact that additional numbers of migrants were beginning to push for entry into the “secure“ states of Europe 
for economic, political, ethnic, and religious reasons. Hundreds of thousands of so-called Germans by descent 
have annually immigrated from East European countries since the mid-fifties, taking their total number up to 2.5 
million by 1994. The third component of today’s migrant population in Germany is formed by war refugees and 
asylum seekers. Annual immigration by this group has varied greatly since 1980, but it topped 230 000 in 1990 
and rose to a peak in 1992, with more than 400 000 people applying for political asylum in that year. The debate 
on immigration began to be dominated by arguments along the lines of “the boat“ being “full”.  The Federal 
Parliament changed the constitution and introduced the so-called safe third country ruling. At the same time, 
Germany accepted 400 000 refugees from former Yugoslavia who are supposed to be repatriated. 
 
 It is hardly surprising, then, that the Federal Republic of Germany has a considerable gap to close in the effort to 
create supporting structures for foreign migrants, in particular as far as the general social network and education 
are concerned, but also in health and welfare.  
 
While ten to fifteen years ago, health policies dealing with these groups hardly envisaged anything beyond 
defensive  measures  aimed  at  the  protection  of  the  indigenous  population  from  infectious  diseases, 
epidemiological studies today point to the fact that such strategies are of negligible importance. What is more, 
these studies stress the necessity of analysing migrants’ specific health needs, and of covering existing deficits in 
a manner realistically tailored to those needs. There is evidence that the cultural background of the host country, 
its medical care system, and traditional conceptions of health and illness, are as important as the circumstances 
of migration, the migrant’s legal and social status in the receiving country, and his or her living conditions there.  
 
According to the Maastricht agreements, national health care systems and social networks are to be harmonised 
in  the  course  of  European  unification.  This  seemed  a  good  reason  to  look  towards  some  of  the  Federal 
Republic’s neighbouring states where more experience has been gathered on health care for asylum seekers and 
war refugees, and excellent models of practical intervention have been developed.   57
So  in  May,  1996,  experts  from  Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  discussed  the  supply  systems  in  their  countries,  sharing  information  on  legal  and 
demographic backgrounds, available epidemiological data, living conditions, as well as health provisions and 
care. 
 
National reports were to contain information on: the legal basis of residence; on differences of legal and social 
status;  laws  and  regulations  governing  social  and  health  care;  demographical  proportions  and  structure  of 
immigrant communities; the type of “medical reception“ each country performs; general health problems of 
asylum seekers and refugees; transmitted diseases; questions of living conditions in the receiving countries; 
prevention  and  health  promotion  as  well  as  specific  group  problems  like  those  of  women  and  children;  or 
traumatised persons. 
 
 
The picture appearing from the national reports is far from uniform. While medical examinations and health 
checks are performed on arriving asylum seekers and refugees in all of the countries, the character of these 
measures is multifarious. In some countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, these checks are carried out 
by nurses; in others, such as Germany and Norway, doctors are involved from the start. On the other hand, 
Germany, and to a certain extent Switzerland, are federal systems in which autonomy at state level can lead to a 
relatively  strong  internal  divergence,  ranging  from  mandatory  screening  (including  HIV  -  testing  without 
consent) to counselling and primary health care measures. In the centralised systems of countries like Sweden 
and Holland, however, similar divergence can be found when comparing measures carried out by municipal and 
county authorities. The type and extent of the initial medical examination is divergent, too. It reaches from a 
screening of the newcomers for specific infectious diseases to a global physical examination combined with 
consultation on all health problems of the asylum seeker or refugee and treatment in the sense of a basic medical 
care. The concept of screening was widely discussed throughout the conference. In several countries the original 
screening, which consisted of mandatory X-rays and blood and stool samples, has been reduced due to both 
epidemiological,  ethical,  and  budgetary  considerations.  In  others,  chest  X-rays  for  tuberculosis  and  blood 
samples for hepatitis, although no longer compulsory, are still strongly “encouraged“ by the reception system. 
As  far  as  HIV  is  concerned,  Sweden  is  probably  the  most  conspicuous  case  of  obligatory  testing  without 
necessarily safeguarding therapeutical measures at the same time, as many of the HIV positive cases belong to 
applicant  groups  with  a  very  low  recognition  rate.  With  all  these  differences,  participants  of  the  Bremen 
conference agreed that the real problem connected with asylum seekers’ and refugees’ health is not the risk of 
them importing infectious diseases and thereby posing a threat to the indigenous population (a risk which is 
nevertheless paid attention to in all systems). The real problem is a complex set of risks endangering the health 
of migrants and resulting from a mixture of factors of the sending society, the cultural background, the migration 
process, and the conditions under which migrant communities subsist in receiving countries. In order to get a 
clearer insight into the interrelated problems of this complicated situation, sharing knowledge, experience, and 
opinion between experts from different countries (all confronted by the same issues) will be both professionally 
helpful and politically desirable.  
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Seen from the perspective of Germany, the neighbouring countries have a head start in both experience with 
immigrant health care and with the general state of the debate on social and health support systems, in a period 
of political pressure against immigration. Thus Denmark, for instance, allows asylum seekers to take on jobs. 
Their children in the school age bracket are obliged to take part in special lessons or join the community schools, 
just  as  is  the  case  in  Sweden  and  Norway.  All  migrant  children  are  part  of  the  Danish  preventive  system 
including dental care. The same is the case in Switzerland, where, on the other hand dental care for adults is not 
included in the otherwise obligatory private medical insurance which is taken out for the asylum seeker/refugee 
by the Federal Office of Refugees. Most of the Danish hostels are organised by the Red Cross which is also 
active in refugee health care in Switzerland. The Danish Red Cross pursues the objective of lodging health care 
for asylum seekers and refugees within the regular health care system. This objective is also targeted by the 
Dutch. In many countries - for example Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Holland - special centres have been 
put  up  to  care  for  migrant  groups  with  specific  problems:  women,  unaccompanied  children  and  youth, 
traumatised people, victims of torture and organised violence, HIV positive people and problem families.  
 
In the Dutch national report, the clarity with which a humane approach was demanded impressed everybody - an 
approach which is apparently practised in the Dutch health care system for migrants in spite of xenophobic 
phenomena emerging from social problems in Holland just as they do almost everywhere else in Europe. As in 
Germany, 1989 presented a conjunctive in the Netherlands, with rising numbers of asylum seekers and migrants 
and a general discussion on the pros and cons of their social upkeep, finally leading to a criticism of existing 
support  procedures  and  a  restructuring  of  the  system.  Since  then,  basic  needs  are  covered  by  the  Centraal 
Orgaan Opvang Asielzoekers (COA), the central organisation for the social support of refugees in whose 80 
decentralised institutions approximately 450 doctors, nurses, and social workers are employed. As in Denmark, 
the procedure in case of illness follows a dual principle: acute and minor diseases are treated immediately while 
non-acute and major problems are dealt with on the adequate level of regular health care.   As asylum seekers are 
not allowed to take up employment in the Netherlands(similar to Germany), facilities maintain libraries, sports 
equipment  and  other  items  necessary  for  leisure  time  activities.    At  present,  the  Dutch  system  is  being 
restructured again, with the aim of assigning an even stronger part in the health care of asylum seekers and 
refugees to municipal health offices in co-operation with the institutions of the regular health care system. 
 
The Danes intend to set up centres for groups with homogeneous or at least comparable cultural backgrounds, as 
the social network is seen to be very important for the individual’s health. “The more you separate and fragment 
the people the more they need personal support“. So if you make groups support themselves, it might be possible 
to reduce or even eliminate some of the problems, at the same time reducing the medicalisation of psychosocial 
factors, making health care more effective, and raising cost effectiveness too.  
 
Strangely, with the exception of the German and Swiss delegates, participants were reluctant to draw the obvious 
conclusion  of  a  systematic  employment  of  qualified  migrants  in  refugee  health  care.  Switzerland  gave  a 
convincing example of imagination used for health promotion faced by communication barriers. In a refugees 
and asylum seekers health project in 1994, a theatre play was used to get across the basics of prevention and 
primary health care, especially in connection with infectious diseases like AIDS. Language communication was   59
seen as an important factor by all participants, suggesting medical professionals to bring their influence to bear 
on politicians to realise this context and give language programmes a higher priority. Sweden is a country where 
this has been done successfully. Apart from obligatory courses on Swedish language and culture, and special 
programmes for children in pre-school and school ages, the Swedes are in the process of building up a national 
network of interpreters. In that country, like in Norway, the employment of interpreters in medical examinations 
is obliged by law. Interpreting in medical contexts, however, as well as in psychosocial counselling, psychiatric 
interviews or therapies remains an unsolved problem in view of the multitude of sending countries and cultures. 
 
In Germany, networks or databases on interpreter employment are only rudimentary and mainly borne by private 
organisations.  The  Norwegian  and  Swiss  delegates  confirmed  the  Bremen  experience  that  interpreter 
employment at low levels of linguistic difficulty could be financed by municipal budgets but are not resorted to 
very much in practice. The overwhelming part of interpreting in refugee and asylum seeker health care seems to 
be contributed by fellow-inmates of hostels, friends, acquaintances, children and unqualified staff of practices 
and hospitals.  
 
 
 
 
Viewed against the background of a sustained mobility of refugees and asylum seekers world-wide, conference 
participants agreed on a number of basic positions held to be essential demands 
 
- to withstand political pressure to use medical procedures as either repressive instruments or 
palliatives  for  the  indigenous  population  (as  is  widely  apparent  in  non-medical  arguments  in 
favour of compulsory screening); and instead base health care on offers of consultation and care 
with  a  voluntary  character  and  accompanied  by  intensified  attempts  to  gather  well-founded 
epidemiological information; 
 
- to promote the exchange of experience and knowledge on the actual epidemiology, health status, 
and health care situation of migrant communities on a European level, especially with a view to 
the diversity of refugee and asylum seeker groups in the cultural and social context, but also in 
regard of legal status; 
 
- to advocate acceptance of minimum standards - in fact any standards - of health care for asylum 
seekers and refugees on the level of standards valid in regular health care and with the eventual 
aim of integrating it into the regular health care system; 
 
- accordingly, to advocate the financing of asylum seeker and refugee  health care, instead of 
through special funds, through existing social and, where applicable, medical insurance systems; 
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- to argue for the intensified employment of qualified migrants in the support systems for asylum 
seekers and refugees, as this is seen as a means to decisively mitigate the problem of language and 
cultural communication barriers; 
 
 
- to generally support those measures aiming at integrating the health care of the various groups 
of migrants into a comprehensive, internationally oriented public health conception; 
 
- to continue the sharing of information on conceptual and structural developments in the health 
care of migrants as a precondition to harmonising the systems used in European countries, in 
accordance with the Maastricht agreements. 
 
In a final resolution, the participants of the Bremen meeting expressed their deep concern over the decision by 
the Federal Republic in favour of an early start to the repatriation of Bosnian refugees, many of whom are 
suffering from open or hidden traumatisation consequences. They appealed to the state authorities responsible 
for repatriation procedures to support a delay of the measures in order to grant the refugees more time for mental 
and psychosocial stabilisation. 
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EVIDENCE-BASED-MEDICINE (EBM), MEGA-TRIALS AND NUMBERS NEEDED TO TREAT 
(NNT) AS IDEALS OF RATIONAL HEALTH CARE 
 
Dieter Borgers 
 
 
1.  Background  
 
The  development  of  a  unified  and  universal  medical  practice  as  a  scientific  and  technological  venture  has 
reached a new stage: 
 
−  need for resources for relevant monitoring of therapeutic progress, which require funds of more than 100 
million  dollars  and  can  only  be  supplied  by  the  USA,  multinational  pharmaceutical  industries  or  other 
organizations on this scale 
 
−  uniform  standards  for  clinical  research  and  uniform  methods  (protocols  in  the  case  of  cancer,  Consort 
Statement, drug regulation) (Schulz 1996) 
 
−  multicentre  studies  carried  out  simultaneously  in  hundreds  of  clinics  worldwide  (mega-trials)  (Hampton 
1992) 
 
−  continuous progress of the Cochrane Collaboration as a future data base of knowledge for clinical action 
(Antes 1995) 
 
−  MEDLINE as a present to mankind by the American Nation via INTERNET (1997) 
 
−  implementation of the randomized trial as the gold standard and favoured clinical instrument for the scientific 
validation of practice (Marks 1997) 
 
−  a pharmaceutical industry, which as a result of mergers over the last years consists of only few multinational 
companies and a biomedical research complex controlled by the National Institutes of Health of the USA 
(50% of all biomedical research funds worldwide) 
 
−  influence  and  prestige  which  few  independent  journals  such  as  Lancet,  BMJ,  JAMA  and  New  England 
Journal of Medicine enjoy all over the world among journalists and scientists, and the worldwide scientific 
monopoly of English as lingua franca 
 
The  concepts  and  rationalizations  resulting  from  these  developments  will  determine  the  medical  future  of 
mankind, of the healthy and the sick. Health policy and the practice of medicine are influenced heavily by 
emerging  new  technologies  and only  the  mere lack of  financial resources  will be the reason  for  not being 
promulgated worldwide within a few months (Hirschel 1998). But phenomena generally introduced under the 
reality and metaphor of technological progress and science are only in few exceptional cases so effective that   62  
they do not call for alternatives. In most cases, biomedicine struggles to combat chronic diseases with successes 
being so negligible and/or questionable, that often hegemonial interests are gaining ground without any relevant 
value for real life practice (Abholz 1980, Bunker 1994, Olshansky 1986). 
 
The fragility of medical effects, above all with regard to long-term effects for chronic diseases, is generally 
masked by false authority and a kind of childlike belief in therapeutic miracles. David Sackett, one of the fathers 
of  Evidence  Based  Medicine  (EBM)  recently  indicated  that  the  hasty  mass  application  of  the  substances 
Flecainid and Amiodaron led to a drastic reduction in the life expectancy of the patients treated and (direct 
quotation) that the „two cardiac drugs killed more Americans than the Vietnam War“ (Die Zeit, 12 March 1998, 
p 40). The increased number of randomized long-term studies carried out in case of chronic diseases showed that 
influences  on  the  long-term  course  of  a  disease  (natural  history)  which  were  based  on  simple,  linear 
prolongations of the acute disease model were hardly effective (e.g. chronic bronchitis) and/or were bought at 
the price of excessive medicalization with negative secondary effects on the quality of life and autonomy. The 
relative irrelevance of the treated biological parameters and the psychologic effects of the patient’s fixation on 
his  disease  hence  modified  the  strategies  tested  in  acute  diseases.  In  this  way,  a  chronic  production  factor 
„medicine“ is a double-edged undertaking for health. 
 
The realistic quantification of (positive and negative) effects is a primary target and basis of EBM (Hemingway 
1997).  In  the  tradition  of  the  English  empiricism  and  pragmatism  the  results  of  long-term  studies  produce 
quantitative evidence of effectiveness (Bucher 1996). From this point of view, EBM is the specification of a 
critical  medicine  which  helps  to  develop  a  discursive  political  and  practical  reality  of  empirical  outcome 
evaluation in contrast to authoritarian claims (Berger 1997, Kunz 1998). Although the randomized clinical trial is 
the preferred technical instrument for gaining knowledge, the empirical orientation operates on a broader basis 
and  should  be  regarded  as  a  „culture“  of  quantification  and  evaluation  (Raspe  1996,  Feinstein  1997).  The 
necessity of such a fundamental orientation makes the EBM movement a reform project which has long since 
been overdue.  
 
The Federal Chamber of Physicians in Germany which recently held a symposium on this subject, expressed the 
view  that  EBM  should  be  supported  with  regard  to  health  policy  and  practical  intentions.  This  allows  the 
conclusion  that  an  important  aspect  of  critical  medicine  has  now  also  reached  this  body.  Since  empirical 
quantification and pragmatic evaluation are not the only concern, this contribution is intended to analyse a 
specific aspect of the overall problem. The latter is characterized by a  shifting of focus in  which  „chronic 
disease“ is seen as something isolated from the subjective feeling of the individual and replaced by a scientific 
programme for improving biological deficits. This backgrond against which EBM is to prove itself shall be 
described in the following. 
 
2.  Biomedical Ideals 
 
Rational  practical  medicine  owes  its  therapeutic  effectiveness  to  communicative  action  and  techniques  of 
controlling nature (biomedicine). The ideal form of communicative action consists of the establishment of a 
personal  doctor-patient-relationship,  and  understanding  within  the  „medium“  of  language.  Its  necessity  is 
derived from the fact that suffering not only implies problems which can be solved by technologies, but also   63  
comprises the complex dimension of  human nature, and  a patients diverse, unique and individual  world of 
experience. For biomedicine as an example for a technological-scientific civilisation, the „real nature“ of man is 
nothing more than a complex machine of the living as a biological organism. Consequently, medicine today 
intends to control, manipulate and improve this machinery and its disturbances. Triumphant successes justify the 
necessity of a more and more complex, medically orientated way of life. 
 
In this context, risk reduction, disease prevention, alleviation of pain and prolongation of life are unproblematic 
self-evidences.  Merely  historical  and  cultural  taboos  (e.g.  gen  technology)  limit  the  practical  interest.  The 
manipulation of biological processes can be traced without any major difficulties because it is a „wertfreies“ 
endeavour. By addressing specific tasks, this „control“ of nature can prove to be successful or fail. If diseases 
could always be overcome, etiologies be removed or dispositions be eliminated, only to be confirmed by formal 
biometric experiments, criticism and a different vision of health to be achieved would not make any sense. 
Indeed, the overcoming of a disease is a metaphor which very seldom materializes in reality. The everyday 
medical routine in hospitals and practices resembles a „stage of siege“ of chronic pathologies which, because 
they cannot be overcome, lead to chronic treatment. Over the last decades, this medicine has developed in such a 
way that the acute disease  model  with its limited ambition of alleviating  symptoms  and providing  medical 
treatment in a crisis situation quantitatively lost so much importance that it is now at the periphery of daily 
medical practice. The shifting of focus towards a chronic medicine as the centre of medical treatment is so 
important  that  most  of  the  involved  problems  such  as  effectiveness,  efficiency,  the  long-term  impact  of 
physicians on the way of life are discussed in theory but have led to few consequences in practice (Burris 1997). 
 
The criticism of the relative inefficiency of long-term medical treatment has up to now mostly been based on the 
argument  that  a  more  continuous  and  improved  permanent  observation  and  treatment  would  lead  to 
corresponding  successes.  Many  practical  reforms  in  health  policy  are  and  have  been  oriented  towards  this 
direction. Deficit analyses and critics of the real medical care situation keep calling for an improved continuity, 
improved coordination, more long term planning and further systematic and integrative strategies for a lifelong 
treatment. The problem of patients’ lack of compliance has led to numerous efforts to optimize such therapies. 
There remains, however, the fundamental question whether the seleced strategies for treating the individual 
patient are effective and efficient in a specific sense. Specific here means that not general care and a possible 
social and psychic stabilisation of the patients is achieved by continuous  treatment but that the biomedical 
techniques as such develop a universal and uniform effectiveness. 
 
The EBM orientation, which has come into existence in the Anglo-American countries since the beginning of the 
90s (Hemingway 1997), has the general objective of empirical and rational medicine with the initial impetus 
being  given  in  obstetrics,  where  many  practices  were  unveiled  as  a  kind  of  magic  of  a  pseudo-scientific 
medicine. Its main field of application in health policy and clinical medicine however has developed in the field 
of chronic medicine. The evidences of a chronic medicine unveiled by the EBM orientation are characterized by 
Mega-trials  and  Numbers  Needed  to  Treat  (NNT’s)  as  methodical  instruments.  Before  analysing  these 
instruments, a practical reality shall be illustrated by giving an example. 
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3.  Chronic Cardiac Insuffiency as an Example 
 
The  possibility  of  treating  chronic  cardiac  insufficiency  with  Digitalis  is  a  recent  and  good  example  to 
demonstrate the fundamental problems of on the one hand symptomatic approval or, on the other hand, a long-
term orientation (prolongation of life, prospective risk reduction in medicine) (Fischer 1997). Particularly in 
Germany in the 1970s (and not only with regard to Digitalis treatment), a routine had developed which, by 
neglecting the conceptional difference between symptomatic and risk-oriented treatment, led to the routine-type 
Digitalis treatment of all patients over 65 years of age. The symptomatic effect of the drug which had long since 
been known and which consists in the improvement of the heart, was regarded as sufficient evidence for a 
lifelong causal therapy, addressing the progression of cardiac insufficiency  with the aim of prolonging life. 
Based  on  this  analogy,  an  extension  of  the  indication  to  the  geriatric  heart  (hence  all  old  people)  seemed 
plausible. 
This general tendency to establish lifelong treatment routines and risk-oriented ways of treatment by drawing 
analogies is opposed by EBM by demanding, that in each individual case a relevant reduction of clinical events 
or a disease-specific prolongation of life by mortality reduction should be proved. The recently completed study 
by The Digitalis Investigation Group (1997) came up to these demands and hence was able to clarify a very old 
controversy  in  internal  medicine.  Whereas  in  the  case  of  cardiac  insufficiency,  the  acute  and  symptomatic 
effectiveness of Digitalis was undisputed, the effect of permanent treatment with the aim of mortality reduction 
and causal influencing of long-term prognoses remained open (Gheorghiade 1997). 
 
In the perspective of lifelong treatments, the known toxicity of Digitalis led to risks which in the end could also 
lead to an increase in the mortality risk, hence to a iatrogenic effect. Thanks to the modern arsenal of multi-
centric randomized long-term studies and the precision they allow, a clarification of this question seemed to be 
realistic.  To  prove  a  life-prolonging  risk  reduction,  a  randomisation  of  n=6800  and  an  average  observation 
period of three years were necessary. Whereas evidence of a symptomatic effect can be furnished within a few 
weeks and with few patients and in the historic perspective the casuistic description of an effect was adequate. 
Fig. 1 shows the result of perfect correspondence of the general mortality risk between treatment and placebo 
group which in the same way was shown for cardiovascular mortality. A small numerical advantage with regard 
to severe heart failure was offset by an increased number of hospital stays due to cardiac arrhythmia. A doctor 
treating 100 patients over a period of one year can only avoid one single case of hospitalization without at the 
same time being able to influence the mortality risk. Quality of life and an alleviation of symptoms are the only 
rational  objectives  for  treatment  which  have  to  be  analysed  in  each  individual  case  whithout  a  universal 
therapeutic-ethical mandate for treatment in general (Packer 1997). 
 
With regard to the overall medical problem in most cases of chronic disease, this categorically clearly negative 
result achieved for Digitalis  is the exception. The quantitative reality of  the published long-term studies  in 
different fields of therapy for different risks, diseases and intervention techniques consists of in most cases 
formally „positive“ results, i.e. stochastically founded reduction of clinical events. In most cases there are no 
categoric yes/no decisions but problems of quantitative assessment which lead to answering the question, as to 
whether the treatment is „worth the effort“. The technical measurement is the so-called NNT (the number of   65  
patients to be treated to avoid an event, NNT = Numbers Needed to Treat). The correct calculation of this figure 
is  a  central  concern  of  EBM.  Supposed,  in  the  studies  the  Digitalis  treatment  had  proved  an  advantage  of 
surviving (corresponding to the number of hospital stays) then a doctor would have to treat 100 patients over a 
period of three years to avoid one single death over this period of time; 99 patients would be treated in vain. 
 
Due to the categorically negative result, evidence-based symptomatic treatment of cardiac insufficiency as a 
chronic disease does not pursue a hidden programme of prolonging life. It is a medicine of the chronically ill 
patient  but  not  chronic  medicine  to  improve  biochemical  or  physiological  deficiencies,    not  wanting  to 
distinguish  between  the  abstract  prolongation  of  life  and  ill  health.  If  in  most  diseases  the  outcome  of  the 
majority  of  the  studies  is  positive,  a  quantitative  measurement    for  their  relevance  has  to  be  found.  This 
quantification invariably leads to a problem of stochastic effectiveness. This stochastic, i. e. in the individual 
case almost accidental effect of an intervention, is a fundamental problem of medical action. The negative results 
achieved in many ambitious long-term interventions however suggest that the limits of practical reason have 
been exceeded. 
 
 
4.  Person-related Medicine as Stochastic Practice? 
 
The  possibility  that  an  abstract  numeric  figure  referred  to  as  NNT  could  become  the  guiding  star  of  a 
scientifically legitimized effectiveness of medicine with regard to chronic diseases looks like the potential reality 
of  a  medical  roulette  representing  itself  as  a  scientifically  based  practice  (Vandenbroucke  1996). Telling  a 
patient (and this is the actual theory and practice of EBM) that a five-year-treatment will have a chance of 1:100 
of taking effect would, according to average comprehension, imply the opposite of effectiveness or scientific 
approach. Since there is a 99 times chance of ineffectiveness and just one single chance of effectiveness, the 
impact of the treatment on the individual and his fate would be nearly accidental and would only be appropriate 
in desperate situations. The normal understanding of doctors (and patients) is based on the assumption that a 
medical therapy, although it does not have to be effective in each individual case, will in general be effective. 
Even the probability that in very few individual cases a therapy could have the opposite effect would still be 
admissable; but if the regularity of an effect falls below a 1:1 ratio (hence 50% of the cases) or if it achieves the 
ratio of just one effect compared to 99 „non effects“, this view would imply a dangerous proximity to quack 
medicine or charlatarism. Translating this problem into (cost) considerations on the benefit-risk ratio in terms of 
health policy can best be achieved by the analogy in which a psychologically oriented permanent treatment of 5 
years would only help every 99th patient - an inefficiency which would even be rejected by the concerning 
professional association. 
 
The concept of calculating NNTs in the case of chronic diseases leads to a realism in terms of efficiency which 
in  the  communicative  situation  of  the  traditional  doctor-patient  relationship  of  course  involves  many 
problems.Confidence  and  reliance  in  medical  treatment  as  a  fundamental  prerequisite  for  therapies  are 
counteracted  at  the  material  level.  Based  on  psychologic  criteria  Abholz  proposed  a  classification  in 
doctor/consumer and doctor/patient relationship which from the pragmatic point of view seems to be adequate 
(Abholz 1993). 
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The demonstrated paradox of an EBM, which in its central field of application is a stochastic medicine cannot be 
avoided from another point of view because each belief in a principally safer and more effective medicine 
(which always helps) seems like childlike faith (Matthews 1995). By taking the example of cardiac infarction via 
cancer treatment to orthopaedic problems and many other chronic pathologies it can be illustrated that medical 
interventions can have impacts which, with regard to the successful avoidance of intended long-term clinical 
targets often lead to a risk-(and/or event) reduction which includes a 30% relative reduction. In the idealized 
example of a controlled clinical trial in which all control experimentees will contract a disease later on and in the 
therapy group no more than 66% (hence a relative risk reduction of about 30%) this would lead to a NNT of 3, 
i.e. in every third case the patient would be helped. If on the other hand a health risk of 1% were taken only 
every  333rd  experimentee  would  be  helped.  This  example  shows  that  the  NNT  is  not  determined  by  the 
effectiveness of the treatment but by the health risk given per se. When determining the NNT which would 
justify a chronic medicine to offset its negative aspects this is not so much determined by the effectivenss of 
treatment but by the given health risk. Whether the chosen therapeutic means has a relative effect of 20%, 30% 
or 60% is of secondary importance. The NNT calculation and the ensuing judgement as to whether treatment is 
worth the effort or not therefore is not so much a judgement on the effective possibilities of treatment but on the 
problem as to when person-related medicine is appropriate. 
 
Its employment will lead to a technically correct quantifying assessment of the effectiveness, but at the same 
time it legitimizes and allows a shifting of objects as legitimate  medical practice. Because this also  means 
equating disease with a risk-oriented biological improvement programme, it is necessary to focus considerations 
on the importance of this process. In clinical routine, this transition is concealed because the ultimate reason of 
all treatment is the reduction of risks and hence the objectivation of the disease implies a quantification of risks. 
Which extent and nature of risks call for medical treatment is the question to be answered. 
 
 
5.  Cosmology of Health Risks as a Mandate for Treatment 
 
The NNT is the reciprocal value of the absolute risk reduction; hence a risk reduction of 1% leads to a NNT of 
100, a risk reduction of 0.5% to a NNT = 200 etc. In this way the figure qualifies the effect by relating it to 
patients treated in vain, without success and even to those treated wrongly, hence those patients who should have 
received no treatment at all. It is the „artefact“ of an instruction which reduces the result of an action (therapy) to 
a Yes/No answer; if the result is measured as a gradual improvement or deterioration it does not make sense 
and/or  includes  a  superfluous  dichotomization  (good  health/ill  health),  where  a  continuum  provides  better 
information (e.g. average reduction of temperature, average alleviation of pain etc). In this case there will be no 
patients treated in vain, but only stronger or weaker individual effects, and/or the usual therapy failures as an 
exception. In this way the practical NNT application could seem to be an operation which constructs an artificial 
satistical result, when in reality all patients receive help. This argument out of the dilemma is not possible 
because no other relevant criterion constitutes the future disease than its actual onset. The therapy of biological 
substitute parameters (surrogates) is a usual procedure but for an EBM no objective of therapy because they only 
represent risk factors, and the question as to whether their present and long-term reduction will make sense is 
justified only by the risk reduction of the later event. Hence the NNT is exactly the right answer to the actual 
problem. Conceptionally, there is nothing to treat apart from the risk of real disease. The stochastic (i.e. the non   67  
regular) aspect of medicine in general differs from this problem in that there is never an individual guarantee for 
effectiveness. There will always be patients treated in vain. The existential situation of a patient seriously ill or 
directly threatened with death leads to the application of medical therapies on which all hopes are concentrated 
with a NNT beyond 100 or 1000. But because in the short and long run as well as individually and depending on 
the social context, ill health and a shortening of life are always a menace, the later analysis of the Mega-trial 
represents an exercise which eliminates individual effects in an abstract population-related risk reduction. 
 
Separating the mandate for treatment of a person-related medicine from the direct experiences of the patient and 
doctor implies the development of a medical object which primarily consists of scientifically „constructed“ long-
term  risks.  Scientifically  constructed  here  means  that  the  systematic  observation  of  large  groups  over  long 
periods of time unveils such future risks and/or courses of a disease as shown by the Digitalis example for 
mortality risks. The more extensive and longer lasting such studies are, i.e. the further remote (e.g. more than 5 
or 10 years) and smaller effects (risks) are regarded as worth the effort, the smaller the risks on which person-
related clinical medicine concentrates (Charlton 1995). In principle there are no limits to a medical risk society 
thus evolving and asymptotically approaching a modern cosmology from which there will be no way out seen 
from the point of view of a „non-medical“ way of living. This development is most advanced in the field of 
medical risk factors for cardiac infarction. The cholesterol depressant drugs (statines) which were for the first 
time admitted in Germany in January 1998 for the so-called primary prevention (up to now semantically only 
admitted in the case of an existing disease) is the model-type implementation of equating health with disease. In 
this case, the last two major long-term studies (Lipid study n = 9000, AFCAPS-study: n = 7000)were stopped in 
1997  for  ethical  reasons  because  risk  reductions  of  cardiac  infarction  with  long-term  medication  could  be 
achieved. If the historic view of the development of randomized studies shows that their N from 10 via 100 to 
1000 and today 100 000 was followed from their medical practice a corresponding development is logical and 
inevitable  if  the  trends  of  the  last  30  years  are  continued  (Borgers  1995).  Studies  carried  out  on  cancer 
chemoprevention (Henderson 1996) and the „Women’s Health Study“ (1 billion US $ research costs) for cancer, 
osteoporosis and cardiac infarction reflect even more ambitious aims. Developments leading into the direction 
over  longer  perspectives  and  smaller  risks  and  among  increasingly  younger  age  groups,  are  the  logic 
consequence. 
 
 
6.  Development of Mega-Trials 
 
The history of the clinical trial as an objective instrument to prove the effectiveness of medical treatment started 
in 1950 (Marks 1997). The Thalidomid-catastrophy led  to its official recognition because  the admission of 
medical  products  by  the  state  now  depended  on  successfully  carried  out  randomized  trials.  Against  the 
background of methodical improvements, the RT has become a routinized instrument of drug-development and 
has  nearly  replaced  all  other  methods  of  empirical  clinical  research  (Abel  1997).  Outside  universities  and 
research institutions a trial industry was set up in which the innovations of the pharmacological industry are 
examined. The request is made and/or has already been implemented in some specialised areas (e.g. cancer 
diseases among children) that every patient should at the same time be randomized in a trial and thus serve 
scientific progress. Today (1998) in connection with cardiovascular diseases 3000 ongoing clinical trials can be 
identified. To examine also long-term effects in cases of a low event risk, so-called Mega-Trials have been   68  
developed (Hampton 1992). In these trials up to 100 000 persons are monitored and receive treatment over a 
period of 5 - 10 years. These figures are necessary to prove a stochastic significance for the usually postulated 
30% risk reduction. The demand to carry out long-term trials in the case of chronic diseases is the result of safety 
aspects of long-term treatment and of the purely empirical view that the mere influencing of risk factors is not 
evidence of effectiveness. In this context, the UGDP-Trial and the Coronary Drug Project-Trial were milestones 
which on the one hand illustrated the enormous efforts needed and the real difficulties and on the other hand 
demonstrated  with  unexpected  (negative)  results  that  in  the  case  of  chronic  diseases  such  a  long-term 
surveillance was absolutely necessary. 
 
In the Womens’ Health Study, the epidemiologic-clinical observation and the randomized clinical trial today 
reach a new historic dimension. In a 15-year study with N = 167 000 women between 50 - 79 years of age first 
the development of risk factors for cancer, osteoporosis and cardiovascular diseases is examined and secondly a 
hormone therapy, nutrition advice and a calcium medication tested in several sub-categories using a double blind 
design. (The Women’s Health Initiative Study Group 1998). Since 50% of the examined women of this age have 
no uterus any more, the hormone substitution consists of two different doses and substances. The end points to 
be evaluated for the significance tests are: breast cancer, colonic cancer, coronary heart diseases and femoral 
neck fractures. In case of a positive result the clinification of the mentioned health risks and/or determinants of a 
disease carried out in the study will lead to corresponding prescriptions in health care. If taking the experiences 
of the riskfactor-oriented epidemiology of the cardiovascular system as an example, the WHI is only the natural 
continuation. Its new dimension consists in the combination of cancer, arteriosclerosis and osteoporosis in one 
study, secondly in the multiple medication and thirdly in the fact that higher age groups are concerned and also 
in the longer observation periods. Related to relative and absolute health risks the new type of patient this 
empirical experience may produce is even more a healthy woman in need of lifelong therapy. The clinical world 
in which these studies are carried out as marathon trials corresponds to the later practice of a correspondingly 
structured  lifestyle.  The  NNT’s  justifying  such  a  therapy  correspond  to  the  above-mentioned  figures.  The 
qualitative and quantitative difference to the established clinifications of blood pressure and cholesterol is not 
very pronounced. If today in Germany it has become routinized practice among cardiologists and even GPs to 
force for example 60-year-old women with cholesterol values of 300 mg% to undergo medication by resorting to 
the threatening gesture of an immediately imminent infarction this is perhaps no more than the starting point of a 
more  extensive  programme.  In  this  programme  there  is  no  category  which  does  not  constitute  a  30%  risk 
reduction proved by a randomized clinical trial as a reality which needs medical treatment. As to the more 
general question of how society and politics should deal with health and ill health and which place personal 
medicine should take the described shifting of objects in medical treatment leads to more and more remote 
diseases and to the usurpation of the health motive into a clinical sphere (Domenighetti 1994). If for example 
NNTs of 100 are established as „significance levels“ for medical long-term interventions, a medical usurpation 
of risks would lead to a comprehensive medical dietetic as an art of prolonging life. In practical discourses 
medical products, chirurgical operations, changed diets, moderate consumption of alcohol (Doll 1997), social 
interventions and changes are then suddenly referred to as risk-reducing factors having the same effect. If these 
discourses are held in clinical settings (doctor’s practices) it is a natural fact that in most cases interventions 
which are more appropriate from the „medical“ point of view will be implemented.  
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7.  Conclusions 
 
With regard to clinical routine, EBM translates a critical approach into practice which has always been the ideal 
of rational medicine. For David Sackett, this means that on the ward round clinical decisions are made with the 
help of online-connections on the ward trolley and direct search in original literature and/or in the Cochrane 
Library. The possible gadgetry in this can in future be replaced by professional information systems. Clinical 
information systems such as electronic patient files will contain knowledge-based tools for making decisions for 
which the Cochrane Library will then provide the basis. The technological aspects of a more direct and detailed 
acquisition  and  processing  of  information  may  easily  turn  out  to  be  an  end  in  themselves  so  that  more 
comprehensive problems are ignored. So for example  the discrepancy between searching  for and providing 
information within seconds and the fact that the decision implies lifelong therapy for which the family doctor has 
to bear the responsibility, is an obvious contradiction. A reasonable solution could be not to start such therapies 
at all in hospitals but to discuss the criteria of an EBM in the doctor’s letter and to recommend a treatment to the 
family  doctor.  Not  adressing  these  problems  in  books  on  EBM  points  out  the  reduced  version  of  ideal  of 
technological intelligence. When quantifying effects, it is in the same way necessary to always consider the total 
reality of the „patient“ and to become aware of the individual implications as the abstract application of risk 
reductions (as personal medicine) will lead to contradictions that cannot be resolved. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum there is the role EBM plays for health policy. To use a term by Schwartz 
(1994), this role will consist in the „clearing out“ of ineffective, damaging and superfluous treatments based on 
Technology Assessment (Schwartz 1994). This is a large terrain for EBM and the discussion about the IGEL list 
(individual  health  services)  of  the  Association  of  Statutory  Health  Insurance  Physicians  shows  to  which 
economically motivated politics EBM leads, although it has hardly begun. Problems however will be entailed by 
a view which considers the political and cultural system of health care as something that can be understood via 
technological-scientific criteria of effectiveness (Berlinguer 1982). If EBM exclusively considers diseases and 
risks as objects to be treated, then a preliminary decision has already been made that a patient is not more than 
the material carrier of these realities. But if the reality of medical routine, particularly in outpatient primary 
health  care  consists  of  communicative  action  in  which  definitions  of  diseases  and  diagnoses  are  tools  for 
understanding and only exceptionally constitute facts which can be found out by technological intelligence these 
facts should be of central importance for a conception of the health system and its political control (Uexküll 
1991, Engel 1977, Schäfer 1994). 
 
The empirical realism of EBM becomes obvious in a medical environment dominated by technological solutions. 
In this way, by its demand for more efficient methods, there is the possibility to only promote these technologies 
in their more efficient versions. If such a view is gaining ground as a political idea of what constitutes a health 
system a congruence with the neo-liberal view of society is achieved. Here as well management and policy are 
only instruments to establish and implement mechanisms which are more efficient from the technological point 
of  view.  The  failure  to  appreciate  social  aspects  and  the  character  as  a  politically  structured  system  of 
communicative action then leads to ignoring what this encompasses: communicative understanding, language, 
time, giving advice, solidarity, support by the environment, social relations etc. Separating such services from 
the health system invariably will lead to increased technological fetishism or other fetish-type phenomena (Kühn 
1993).   70  
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